

THOUGHT

NOT A FUNCTION OF THE BRAIN:

A REPLY

TO THE

ARGUMENTS FOR MATERIALISM

ADVANCED BY

MR. W. LAWRENCE,

IN HIS

LECTURES ON PHYSIOLOGY.

Καὶ τὰχα δ' ἐκ γαίης ἐλπίζομεν ἐς φάος ἐλθεῖν
Λεϊψάν ἀποικομένων· ὑπίσω δε θεοὶ τελέθονται.
Ψυχαὶ γάρ μίμνουσιν ἀκήριοι ἐν φθιμένοισι.
Πνεῦμα γάρ ἐστι θεοῦ χρῆσις θνητοῖσι καὶ εἰκῶν.
Σῶμα γάρ ἐκ γαίης ἔχομεν, καὶ πάντες ἐς αὐτὴν
Λνόμενοι κόνις ἔσμεν· ἀὴρ δ' ἀνὰ πνεῦμα δέδεκται.—*Phocylides.*

Sic mentem hominis, quamvis eam non videas, ut Deum non vides, tamen ut Deum agnoscis ex operibus ejus, sic ex memoriâ rerum et inventione et celeritate motûs, omnique pulchritudine virtutis, vim divinam mentis agnoscito.—*Cicero.*

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IT was but recently that Mr. Lawrence's Lectures on Physiology fell into my hands : upon reading over his arguments in favour of Materialism, it appeared to me that they were such as admitted of an easy refutation ; and hearing, at the same time, that they had made a certain impression in some quarters, I thought it might be useful to shew, in a small compass, the opposite side of the question. With this view I threw together the contents of the following pages. Perhaps it may be thought that, in some instances, I have extended my observations beyond what the immediate occasion may seem to require ; but this I did, with the object of displaying more fully what that doctrine really is which Materialists profess, and of tracing out some few of the absurdities which it more remotely involves. The argument from Common Consent I have especially treated at some length ; because, although it has been urged frequently in a general way, I have no where seen it carried to particulars : and yet it is only when the opinions of mankind on the nature of the soul are *collected* and placed under the eye, in one body, that we are fully struck with their surprising uniformity, or can duly estimate the entire strength of that argument.

The time which has elapsed since the Lectures on Physiology were published, would have deterred the author of this little work from sending it into the world, if the subject discussed in it were of transient importance, or limited influence. Certainly, it is not one of those subjects which are likely to give amusement to such as read for pastime only, or to attract those whose standard of utility is taken from the common business of life. Nevertheless, the nature of the soul of man is a question curious in itself, momentous as to its consequences, and which must always interest every thoughtful mind. If inquiries are esteemed, which embrace objects of science or literature, or those mechanic arts that minister to the comfort and elegance of life; surely investigations can never be valueless which concern that principle, but for whose agency neither elegance, comfort, art, learning, or science, would have any existence.

C.

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&c.

IN a former age, some mathematicians fell into disbelief of the existence of spiritual natures, because that existence could not be demonstrated like a proposition of geometry. Subsequently, an entire school of French philosophers laughed, after their manner, at all those who thought it not impossible that the universe might contain orders of beings endowed with properties altogether different from any which the material world exhibits to the organs of sense, chiefly, as appears from the general tenour of their reasonings, because they, the said philosophers, had never been able to trace the spirit of man by the point of the dissecting knife, nor to find it at the bottom of a retort or crucible. The author of these lectures is a physiologist, and assumes as the basis of his reasonings, that from the researches of physiology, the existence of spirit may be either discovered or negatived. This principle he does not indeed convey to his readers in a formal proposition, but it is implicitly acknowledged by the very nature and complexion of his arguments, all of which constantly refer to, and are indeed founded upon doctrines and facts derived from that science. Either then, he refers idly to a science unconnected with the question in debate, or he assumes the principle which I have mentioned.

Previous to entering upon a detailed examination of the arguments which rest upon this principle, as upon their proper foundation, it will be necessary to inquire a little into the solidity of the foundation itself; to ascertain whether the science of physiology be really capable of furnishing any evidence, by which the existence of spirit may be either confirmed or invalidated. If it can be shewn, that the

science which treats of the mind is wholly distinct from that which concerns the vital economy of the body; that the branches of these two sciences never interweave, that their streams are never confluent; it will appear, that an endeavour to establish conclusions in the one, upon premises drawn from the other, is to confound things distinct in nature, and is only adding one error more to an ancient accumulation. Thus divested of the paraphernalia of an adventitious and irrelevant science, the arguments themselves will contract to their proper size and figure, and will be speedily recognized as kindred to those which have been so repeatedly urged by materialist philosophers, and no less frequently refuted, from the days of Lucretius downwards to the present age. They will at once be known as mere fragments, broken from the frame-work of an ancient and repudiated system; as relics, preserved like the statues of the ancient gods, not in veneration of the divinity, but for the sake of the artist; as some of those sapless and mouldering bones, which the enchantments of the Roman poet clothed with life, and presented to the admiration of the world, tinged with the perennial bloom, and encircled with the immortal radiance of celestial youth.

The subjects of human knowledge are divisible into classes, according to the species of evidence used in their investigation. The modes of proof by which we demonstrate the properties of a curve, and establish a moral duty, are widely and essentially different; and to confound them would lead to the most erroneous and absurd conclusions. These extremes are indeed rarely mistaken one for the other, but the species of evidence which lie between them are more frequently misapplied than is generally, I think, suspected; and from this misapplication result not a few of those theories, which for a time amuse by their novelty, and fall, when this charm is worn out, into neglect and oblivion. Let a disciple of Lavater look but on a man's face,—he will draw you the character of the individual, and give the history of his race. The physiognomist assumes as a principle, that a relation subsists between the lines of the human countenance, and the character of man, as a moral and intelligent being. The craniologist, on the other hand, neglects the countenance, and attaches himself to the protuberances of

the skull. In former days, palmistry was regarded as no mean science; books were written concerning it, and its professors were esteemed. Here it was presumed, that the lines of the hand held some mysterious connection; not, indeed, with the existence of the soul, but, at least, with its propensities and passions. Lastly, the physiologist steps in, discourses of the functions of the brain, and at once connects them with the phenomena of mind, in virtue of a like easy assumption of a principle belonging to the same category, which before had so commodiously supplied the wants of the physiognomist, the craniologer, and the chiromant.

A vast multitude of the strange and whimsical opinions into which philosophers have so frequently fallen, will be found to have proceeded from their demanding of the evidence peculiar to their favourite science, conclusions which it was not calculated to afford. The conduct of many scientific men of the present day is, in this respect, not a little singular and inconsistent; especially when the question at issue concerns, or is supposed to concern, theology. Here they are all rigour, all in alarm, lest they should be caught in the meshes of prejudice. Each *sçavant* demands that the inquiry shall be conducted after his own fashion, that the discoveries, or imagined discoveries, of his own science, shall tally with the evidence produced, and that even difficult and obscure points in that science, shall not appear to make against doctrines, otherwise supported by cogent, and, to every unbiassed mind, satisfactory reasoning. I say unbiassed; for what but a strong previous bias can be supposed so to operate on men, whose researches into nature must familiarize them with inexplicable mysteries, and stupendous exertions of infinite wisdom and power, as to make them stumble at any doctrine, merely because it involves what is wonderful? The pursuits of natural science, one might conclude, were the best of all possible preparations for the reception, or at least for the impartial investigation, of moral doctrines of such a nature; and so they are always found to be, whenever the man of science is humble, candid, and sincere; whenever he is found to love truth better than vanity; in a word, whenever he is a true philosopher. But a horror of believing as the vulgar believe, often hurries men of learning into prejudices, as gross and ridiculous, as

any which, in that vulgar, they are so eager to reprobate and despise.

It is thus that the geologist, who has excavated the earth a few feet deeper than the rabbit and the mole, descants on the creation of our planet, as though himself had been present, consulted, and assisting, when "the Spirit of God" first "moved on the waters;" and, when at the completion of the stupendous work, the "morning stars sang together, and all the sons of God shouted for joy." Evidence drawn from any other source, he undervalues and contemns, less because prepared to shew it to be fallacious, than because unable to reconcile it with his own limited observations and pre-conceived opinions. In like manner, the physiologist, at a loss to assign adequate functions to the brain in the animal economy, overlooks all that observation and argument, drawn from a variety of sources, urge for the existence of spirit; and relying solely on the few facts which he has collected, becomes at once a materialist.

Physiology, in its more restricted, but common acceptation, is the science which explains the phenomena of life. The objects of its contemplation are the bodies of men and animals; objects discerned by the senses, and plainly material. If spirit exist at all, its existence can be discovered by us, in two ways only; either by the deductions of reason, upon a view of its operations, or by the immediate agency of our senses. If spirit be discoverable by the senses, its nature and properties are certainly within the scope of physiology. But in that case, spirit must possess some, at least, of the essential properties of matter; since only that which is material, is an object of sense. That is to say, spirit must be essentially material; or spirit must be spirit, and not spirit, at the same time, before any truths concerning it can be predicated by a science which deals only with sensible, that is, with material objects.

Therefore, if physiology fail in discovering the existence of spirit, such failure is no proof of its non-existence.

Also, if physiology adduce any phenomena against the existence of spirit, they are inadmissible; for it has been proved generally, that physiology cannot predicate any truth concerning spirit.

Respecting all such phenomena our inference *à priori*,

ought to be, that our knowledge of them is probably imperfect. And I believe, I may venture to assert, that this inference will be confirmed by experience, in almost every instance in which such phenomena have been appealed to. In all these instances, it will be found that the facts brought forward, are not such as stand out in a clear and full light, and are well known in all their relations; but facts, or surmised facts, drawn from those dim recesses of science, where truth and error cease to be plainly distinguishable in the faint and uncertain twilight.

Perhaps it will be objected, that the researches of physiology may discover in matter, causes adequate to produce the phenomena which we now ascribe to the agency of spirit; the existence of which may in this manner be negatived, in accordance with the well-known rule, that no more causes are to be admitted, than are sufficient to explain the appearances of nature.

The answer to this objection, is:

1. No such discovery as is here supposed, has yet been made. The supposition moreover assumes as decided, the question at issue, which is, whether the subjects of physiology are, in their nature, such as can probably lead to discoveries concerning spirit.

2. If the discovery supposed were actually made, it would not be sufficient to negative the existence of spirit. Spirit, by which I here mean the soul of man, is not a mere cause of phenomena, like attraction, for instance, in matter; it is a being; and might be held to exist, and be capable of acting upon matter conjunctly with material causes, unless its co-existence along with such causes, could be shewn to be impossible. If the physiologist could demonstrate to the senses, that matter is capable of thought, I must confess that his argument against the existence of an immaterial principle in man, would thereby be greatly strengthened; but I can by no means admit, that even such a demonstration would be conclusive evidence. I apprehend it would only amount to a proof that in *one* being, *two* natures might exist, each capable of exerting similar powers. To shew, in the fullest manner, that one agent is capable of producing certain effects, can never be sufficient to disprove the existence of any other agent.

3. If the argument in the preceding remark be valid, it follows from it, that the philosophical rule, cited in the objection, is restricted to secondary material causes, and does not extend to the existence and operations of intelligent beings.

It appears, therefore, if the view of the subject here taken be just, that from the science of physiology we have not any reason to expect information concerning the nature and operations of the human mind.

Let us now ask the materialist what he understands by the term matter, and how he comes to the knowledge of its existence? Many definitions have been given of matter, disagreeing among themselves in a variety of particulars, but all, or nearly all, referring either expressly, or implicitly, to impressions made by its properties on the senses. Some such definition is therefore probably to be expected from every materialist. As to the way, in which he acquires his knowledge of the existence of matter, he will, it is presumable, refer us directly to the testimony of sense.

On the other hand, let us inquire what is meant by spirit, and how the knowledge of its existence is acquired? Spirit, we define, to be, *being endowed with consciousness of its own existence; intelligent, and powerful*. Our knowledge of it is acquired principally by consciousness of what passes within ourselves; but is enlarged and confirmed by comparative views of its properties with those of matter, and also by arguments drawn from analogy.

The existence of matter, then, is evidenced by the testimony of *sense*; the existence of spirit, by the testimony of *consciousness*. We know that on some occasions our senses deceive us, or at least produce imperfect and inadequate notions of external objects, until corrected by means within our power; whereas the consciousness of what passes in a man's own mind, affords knowledge full, intimate, and certain in the highest possible degree. Deception is here impossible, and truth absolute. But not to insist on this superiority so strongly as the case may warrant, I shall content myself with asserting, that the evidence by which we prove the existence of spirit, is, in all respects, equal at the least, to that by which the existence of matter is substantiated. In other words, that species of reasoning which leads the ma-

terialist to distrust the evidences of an immaterial soul in man, will prove equally, that the evidences of the existence of his material body are not to be relied on. For, if our own consciousness deceive us, what security have we that our eyes, and ears, and all the organs of sense, do not deceive us likewise; nay, that our notion of the existence of those very organs, is not a mere cheat and imposture? The constitution of the human mind, however, leads all men to believe differently, and as this constitution is universal and inseparable from the mind, it must undoubtedly be held to have been designed by the Creator. But, if the consciousness of man's own existence, and all the appearances of external things, be mere illusions, and if man (whatever under such circumstances man might be conceived to be), is nevertheless so constituted, as to believe them to be realities; we are reduced to the impious absurdity of making the Creator eminently chargeable with "acting a lie," co-extensive with creation, in the face of his intelligent creatures, But, what are we to think of a scheme which involves such consequences as these, what of a disputant, who discredits the testimony of his own senses (as the materialist must do, if he will not deny the legitimate inferences from his own principles), or, what opinion are we to entertain of a mode of reasoning, by which it may be shewn, that man, both soul and body, is a mere fiction, an utter nonentity?

There have not been wanting philosophers, who have denied the existence of matter. One of these, if disposed to deal with the materialist, as he disputes against the doctrine of spirit; might perhaps argue something in this manner. He might say to his opponent:—You tell me that you discover the existence of matter, by perception. Shew me then, where this perception resides. Is it in the organs of sense, or in the nerves, which are supposed to convey to the brain the impressions received by those organs, or lastly, is it in the brain itself? When you do not perceive, it is the same to you as if the perceivable object had no existence. How then can you expect to satisfy me, that the objects of sense exist at all, except in a mind perceiving them; seeing that they apparently cease to exist, whenever perception ceases to be exercised. You are conscious of the existence in your mind of certain ideas, the causes of which you assign

to external objects. The existence of those ideas, you are indeed able to prove to me, by reason that I myself possess a consciousness similar to your own; but when you go beyond this, and endeavour to assign causes for those ideas, existing externally; you then go beyond the limits of your own mind, out of which, it is most evident, that you cannot know any thing. You observe also, that the perception of an object now present, and the recal of that perception by memory, even during sleep, produce ideas equally vivid, and perfectly similar. Tell me, do those ideas differ *essentially*, or do they differ at all? So far as perception extends, they are identical. Perception, then, may exist without the presence of the object; its presence, therefore, is not *essential* to the perception. Moreover, if you admit the existence of an infinite Intelligence, you must admit, that to such a mind, the perception of things *in posse*, is as clearly possible, as the perception of things *in esse*. You cannot deny that such a mind might so constitute inferior minds, that, to the extent of their capacities, they should perceive in like manner, and upon this, I know not how you can satisfactorily shew, that the human mind is not so constituted, and does not so perceive.

But should I, for the sake of argument, admit it to be possible, that, in some way or other, you might arrive at an obscure probability, that there exist certain secondary, and by you termed material, causes of our ideas, you will never be able to evince, that those causes resemble, of necessity, their effects produced in the mind. You can never shew, that our perceptions are exact copies of external objects. You are acquainted with the cause, only through the medium of its effect, and are therefore destitute of any direct means of reasoning concerning its relation thereto, in point of resemblance. In order to compare two things together, both must be known. Analogy, leans the contrary way. The impulse which generates motion, has no similitude to motion; nor does any thing resembling pain, reside in the steel which cuts, or the fire which burns. The rose, we know, is not in itself red, nor the lily, white; but the rays of light, blended or divided in certain proportions, excite the ideas of those colours. How then will you prove to me, that the actual existence of the object, as a faithful *type* of the perception,

is *necessary* to that perception; or rather, how can you avoid admitting it to be possible, that external objects may in themselves be very different from our perceptions of them? They may, for all you can shew to the contrary, be mere *powers*, producing sensations in *sensoria* fitted to receive them;—ideas, excited in a mind capacious of them;—powers, or ideas, continually emanating from the fountain of all power and intelligence.

These are but a few of the many difficulties which the materialist must encounter in building up his system; and from a careful consideration of them, he will perceive that they are founded on cognate principles, and deduced in a similar manner with the chief objections which he urges against the existence of spirit, and which may thus be successfully retorted on his own system. What are we to infer then? That the universe is all spirit? or all matter? or neither? Whichever of these schemes we adopt, we shall equally find ourselves bewildered in a thorny maze of inextricable difficulties, and beset with inferences of the most monstrous absurdity, forcing themselves upon us, at every step of our progress. A more sane and philosophic view of this question, and to my apprehension, the only one remaining, after rejection of the three preceding hypotheses, is to conclude, That, although our knowledge of spirit, as well as of matter, is limited and imperfect, yet that we have at the least, as good evidence for the existence of the one, as for the existence of the other. That the co-existence of these two natures in one being, involves no contradiction, and is therefore possible. That the properties, or perhaps more correctly, the operations of spirit, as discerned by consciousness, being totally distinct and different from the properties of matter, as discovered by means of the senses, we are led to infer, according to the soundest rules of philosophizing, that spirit and matter are, in essence, totally distinct and different. That the probabilities for the existence of spirit and of matter, are equal, and that those probabilities amount to the highest possible degree of moral evidence.

I shall now proceed to examine the arguments by which Mr. Lawrence attempts to prove, that our intellectual faculties result from the organization of our bodies; and by which he hopes to reason us out of that better part of our being,

the soul, which we now fondly believe to be both immaterial and immortal. His arguments I shall set down in his own words, and shall reply to them with such only as have carried conviction to my own mind.

The first argument which I meet with runs thus:—

“The same kind of facts, the same reasoning, the same sort of evidence altogether, which shew digestion to be the function of the alimentary canal, the motion of the muscles, and various secretions of their respective glands, prove that sensation, perception, memory, judgment, reasoning, thought—in a word, all the manifestations called mental or intellectual—are the animal functions of their appropriate organic apparatus, the central organ of the nervous system.”—*Lect. 4. page 91.*

The various bodily phenomena here mentioned, are evidenced in many ways by our senses in the living man, and are confirmed by the anatomy of the dead, in the most ample manner. But our senses, with all the aids of anatomy, do not discover thought in the brain. It is from consciousness alone that we learn its existence. But consciousness does not establish any such connexion between the brain and thought, as observation shews to exist, between the stomach and digestion, between the liver and bile, between any gland and its appropriate secretion. On the contrary, when a man turns his contemplations inward, and considers his own existence, he feels an intimate persuasion, a consciousness, that the thinking, acting being, which he calls himself, is neither any part of his body, nor a result of the union of its various parts together. His body, he holds off from him as it were, and contemplates it as something external and distinct from himself. This consciousness of our existence, distinct from the body, although in all men it is not equally vivid and luminous, on account of their different capacities, is nevertheless common, in a certain degree, to all the individuals of the species. In itself, it is a remarkable phenomenon of the human mind; and the evidence which it affords of the existence of spirit is as strong, for aught I can see, as the common consent of mankind is capable of furnishing on any subject whatever; such as, that fire burns; that stones are not buoyant in water; that the sun gives light. *These truths are known by frequently reiterated tes-*

timonies of sense, and *that*, by an experience, continued through every moment of our existence.

Thus, it appears, that the evidence which connects the animal functions with their organs, and that which proves any truth whatever, concerning the phenomena of mind; so far from being of the "same sort," are radically different.

What is meant by the same kind of facts, I know not, unless he intend to assert, that we find imagination and memory in the lobes of the brain, as we find bile in the liver and biliary duct, or chyle in the lacteals. "The same reasoning," can only mean, that we draw conclusions from premises, whether the subject of discussion be spirit or matter. This I am ready to grant; but am unable to discern what use my antagonist can make of the concession.

Thought, we are told, is the *animal function* of the brain, as the secretion of bile is that of the liver. Let us consider this proposition a little in detail.

The brain of a new-born infant is as perfectly formed in all its parts, as are the heart, the lungs, the liver, and other organs. Like them, the only change which, so far as we know, it afterwards undergoes, is an increase of bulk, and perhaps a somewhat greater consistence. Now the heart, the lungs, the liver, the other parts of the body, begin to discharge their respective offices, some, at the instant of birth, others, before birth. Can the materialist shew any reason why the brain, being as perfectly formed as those organs, and, so far as we know, as completely fit for the discharge of its office, its *animal function*, as they are for the discharge of theirs, respectively, does not begin to discharge it at the same time. If thought be the animal function of the brain, and as the brain is as perfectly formed, and as ready for thinking, as the heart for circulating the blood, why does it not think, and think too in a manner analogously perfect? Will it be said, that the brain waits to receive its materials for thinking from without, and that external objects stimulate it to think, just as food excites the stomach to digest? But the stomach, in a healthy state, performs its first act of digestion as perfectly as its thousandth; why should the functions of the brain be only the result of multiplied experiments? All analogy is here against the materialist. Does the heart require to be taught how to

beat? are the muscular motions the result of study? Does experience by numerous lessons educate the pupil of the eye to contract, the auditory membrane to vibrate, or do her precepts instruct the nerves how to convey sensation throughout the frame? Why should the brain alone stand in need of foreign assistance to perform a function, which is asserted to be analogous to those of the other organs? If it be said, that the brain is not cogitative, or imperfectly so, in the infant, because it has not as yet attained sufficient volume and consistence: I reply, that this supposition is upset by the fact, that the mental powers enlarge, nay, generally make their most important enlargement, at a period of life long after the brain has ceased to advance either in magnitude, or firmness of contexture; a fact which evinces in the clearest manner, that the magnitude and consistence of the brain have not any connexion with the progress of the intellectual powers.

Farther, It is asserted by physiologists, that the particles which compose the human body are in a state of perpetual flux and change; so that it is probable, that of all these particles, not one shall be found in the same body, after the lapse of a certain period of time. Upon this I might ask the materialist, how, if the mind be material, he can conceive personal identity to subsist under such a change and perpetual flux of the particles of the body? But from this argument, well urged by others, I shall for the present abstain, and content myself with requesting him to consider, how memory can be conceived to subsist under such circumstances; if that faculty be held to be a mere function of the brain. Whether it be supposed, that memory is a result of the whole congeries, or of a portion only of that congeries of particles which compose the brain, it will follow: that the abstraction of one particle, must either carry off with it a portion of memory (in which case we infer that memory is a thing divisible into parts), or else, the particle abstracted must be supposed to transfer its portion of memory to the particle which succeeds and takes its place. Such a transfer must be either voluntary, or involuntary. If voluntary, we must be conscious of the volition by which the transfer is executed. But we are never conscious of any such volition. Therefore, no voluntary transfer is made. An involuntary

transfer implies the possibility of a change, or if you will, an operation continually going on in one of our faculties, of which we are wholly unconscious. But consciousness is nothing more than the knowledge which the mind has of itself, whether in an active or passive state, and can no more be separated, even in idea, from its affections and operations, than those affections and operations can be separated from themselves. We cannot imagine the existence of a thinking being apart from consciousness. When we imagine, remember, reason, the mind may be said to exist in the mode of imagining, remembering, reasoning; and consciousness *necessarily* co-exists with that mode. The mind cannot exist in one mode, either as agent or subject, and be conscious of existing, at the same instant, in another mode. This would be as impossible, as for two bodies to occupy the same portion of space, at the same time. Consciousness of two different kinds, or, if I may use so uncouth an expression, two *consciousnesses*, necessarily imply two minds. But the argument here is of one mind only. If, therefore, a change or operation can take place in one mind, such as the supposed internal motion of the particles of memory, and the mind be at the same time conscious of quiescence, as under the case of involuntary transfer it must be; then it follows, that two distinct *consciousnesses* can exist in *one* mind; that is, *one* mind can be as *two* minds; that is, one being can be separated from itself.

The Materialist, therefore, who contends that memory is generated by the brain, as bile is secreted by the liver, is driven to admit, that memory may be divided into parts, like a piece of metal, or wood; that such a division is constantly going on, attended with an incessant motion of its particles among themselves; that, notwithstanding this, the memory undergoes no change in the gross, and is all the while unconscious of its own internal state; which, as has been, I think, proved, is equivalent to asserting, that a being can be separated from itself.

It is evident that what is thus proved concerning the memory, may in like manner be shewn of every other faculty of the mind. Consequently, the proposition of the Materialist, that the operations of the mind generally are animal func-

tions of the brain, is proved to involve the most absurd impossibilities, and therefore to be itself absurd and untrue.

When the Materialist shall have removed these difficulties, it will not be the end of his labours, for many others, equally perplexing, may be proposed for his future consideration. In the mean time, it will be observed, that all the difficulties resulting from his system, are so many positive arguments in favour of his opponents. For, as every proposition, or its converse, is true; and the proposition in this case being, that the soul is material; whatever tends to invalidate it, tends *necessarily*, in an equal degree, to prove that the soul is *not* material.

Lect. 4. p. 91. “ Shall I be told that thought is inconsistent with matter, that we cannot conceive how medullary substance can perceive, remember, judge, reason? I acknowledge that we are entirely ignorant how the parts of the brain accomplish these purposes.—Experience is in all these cases our sole if not sufficient instructress: and the constant conjunction of phenomena as exhibited in her lessons is the sole ground for affirming a necessary connexion between them. If we go beyond this, and come to inquire the manner how, the mechanism by which these things are effected, we shall find every thing around us equally mysterious,” &c.

I shall not tell the Materialist that I cannot conceive *how* medullary substance can think; but what I shall tell him is, that I cannot conceive that medullary substance *does* think. Of that substratum, or essence in which thought resides, I know nothing; nor does the Materialist know any thing of the essence of matter. Both spirit and matter are known by their properties only. The properties of spirit are entirely different from the properties of matter, and therefore I distinguish between them, and for a like reason that I distinguish between an animal and a stone; and I am as certain that spirit and matter are distinct, as I am that a horse is not a stone—and the grounds of my certainty are the same, namely, the consideration of their respective properties.

Thought cannot be a property common to all matter, for if it were, then the trees in the wood, and the stones in the

street, would think. But this notion only a madman could utter, and a madman only could entertain.

Thought is not the result of any collection of matter peculiarly disposed.

Every collection and disposition of matter is effected only by mechanical or chemical means, and in no other way, so far as is hitherto discovered.

Mechanical agency creates no new property in matter; it merely gives power and direction to properties already existing.

Chemical agency combines and separates, rarefies and condenses, portions of matter. It presents bodies varied into new forms, but creates nothing new. Its operations are resolvable into the principles of attraction and repulsion, which principles concern only the motions and relative situations of the parts of matter among themselves.

Therefore neither mechanical nor chemical agency can be causes of thought, unless thought be supposed to exist generally, as a property of matter, which has been shewn to be absurd. Consequently, thought is not the result of a peculiar disposition of matter.

Thought is not something superadded to matter, and existing contingently on a certain organization. If thought be superadded to matter, it must be first created, and so must exist as a property in the abstract. In this state it is clearly not a property of matter, and the Materialist will not allow it to be a property of spirit; it must therefore be a property of nothing. Thus, in the scheme of the Materialist, non-entity must be imagined to have properties. Moreover, the addition of thought to matter could not make it an inherent property of matter; therefore its supposed contingent existence must depend on some particular law of nature, other than that which renders the existence of properties dependent on the existence of the substances to which they belong. No such law is known to exist; consequently the supposition that thought exists contingently, is a groundless imagination.

The Materialist may perhaps be dissatisfied with a mode of proof which deduces the independent existence of an immaterial principle from the properties of thought, and which establishes itself by shewing that every other supposition

involves gross and manifold absurdities. He may be so unreasonable as to expect some more direct evidence. I reply, that none such is afforded by nature; not in the case of spiritual existence only, but in all cases of elementary knowledge. Ask the geometer on what grounds he believes the axioms of Euclid? he will say, that his certainty of their truth is intuitive. Ask the Materialist why he believes that he has a body? His senses, he replies, testify its existence. That they do so testify, is a proposition admitting of no evidence. It is a primordial truth, and to ask for a demonstration of a primordial truth, is to require an impossibility.

“Experience,” says the lecturer, “is in all these cases, our sole if not sufficient instructress.”

In all these cases, therefore, the result of the general experience of mankind is decisive.

Upon this proposition I join issue with the Materialist, and shall endeavour to prove:

I. *That the ordinary experience of mankind is competent to decide the question.*

II. *That it has decided it against Materialism.*

I. The facts which regard the existence and nature of the soul, and the means of judging concerning them, are equally possessed by all men.

Experience is knowledge acquired by observation. In natural science the properties and accidents of external things; in morals, the motives and actions of intelligent beings, constitute the subjects of inquiry. In each of these great departments of science, the field of observation is so vast, and is diversified with such a variety of objects, as to present to minds like ours, the semblance of infinity. Here the noblest genius can effect but little in comparison of what is left undone; age rolls on after age, contributing something indeed to the common stock of knowledge, but still bringing forward new objects for the investigation of succeeding generations. As the traveller ascends the steep hill of science, his prospect becomes more extensive and various; every moment the horizon widens, provinces and kingdoms open beneath him, new continents stretch out, new oceans glitter; immensity spreads around, and the universe, with boundless magnificence, dazzles and overwhelms him.

When the philosopher turns from these vast scenes to

contemplate the existence and nature of the human mind, he is struck with surprise at the contrast which he beholds, and feels uneasy in the narrow limits which bound his speculations. He perceives, that here one mind is the observer, and one mind only is the object of observation. It is the eye beholding the reflection of itself. To that one mind his observations are restricted, as completely as if it were the only mind existing in the universe. In all that concerns the existence of the soul, and the operations by which that existence is evidenced, each man is conscious of whatever any other man can be conscious. For, if the philosopher could discover in the mind phenomena concealed from his less enlightened fellow-men, it is plain that such discoveries must be made in his own mind only. That is, he must be conscious of something of which others are not conscious. But I have already shewn, it is presumed successfully, that touching the operations of the mind, unconsciousness and non-existence are the same thing. The reasonings of the philosopher would therefore regard a being different, *quodàd* his discoveries, from the souls of other men; which consequently could be neither embraced nor affected by those reasonings. They can be received, in any case, as general, only so far as the minds of all men are supposed to be similarly constituted and subject to the same laws. His conclusions must therefore be deduced from phenomena equally displayed in the minds of all men. But, if displayed, all men must be conscious of them. The experience of one man is therefore perfect and decisive as to all such phenomena. The experience of the clown is equally extended with that of the philosopher, who but arranges, connects, and elucidates the results of their common experience.

2. The facts, then, by which the existence and operations of the soul are evidenced, lie equally open to all men. All are, likewise, equally competent judges of those facts.

In almost every scientific pursuit, the philosopher is frequently compelled to rely upon the observations of others. In all that relates to past ages, our only dependance is upon testimony. But with respect to the phenomena of mind, every man observes them for himself and sees them precisely as they exist. No deceptive medium intervenes, there

is no room for any doubt to enter. Our opponents will perhaps go thus far along with us ; but may deny that men are equally competent to deduce from the known phenomena of mind, the cause of those phenomena. I reply :—All the properties of mind are equally known, as I have endeavoured to prove. When all the properties of any thing or being are known, all the possible means of judging concerning its nature are possessed. In a question which relates to a man's own being, and which on that account must at one time or other be revolved in every mind ; which is not composed of long and intricate chains of reasoning, but which, in fact, amounts only to distinguishing between two things, the entire properties of which are different ; the possession of talents and learning give, in reality, but a slender advantage. The philosopher can distinguish between fire and ice, and sets forth, with ingenuity and order, whatever is to be said concerning heat and cold ; but, as to the main point of distinguishing between them, the plough-boy does it as well as the philosopher. The same experience, the same materials, are possessed by both of them. And not only in this, but in most of our reasonings, error chiefly springs from defective materials, rather than from inability to place those materials in order.

Farther ; men are satisfied that they have bodies, because their senses inform them so. This is the result of common experience, and the Materialist regards its evidence as sufficient. Men believe that they have a soul, because they think. This is the result of their common experience concerning their incorporeal part ; and to my apprehension, the evidence of thought, as to its peculiar object the soul, is precisely of the same character and weight, as the evidence of the senses, with respect to the body. The senses are intended for gathering information of external objects, and are neither calculated, nor designed, for the detection of thought. To imagine such an employment of them, would be as absurd as to speak of hearing the scent of a nose-gay, or seeing the sound of a trumpet.* The Materialist, however, denies an immaterial soul, because he cannot discover it by aid of

* ὥσπερ οὖν εἰ τις ἐπιθυμεῖ ἰδεῖν τὸν ἥλιον, οὐχὶ ταῖς ἀκοαῖς ζηρεῖται αὐτοῦ τὴν σύνεσιν· οὐδ' εἰ τις τῆς ἐν φωναῖς ἁρμονίας ἐρεῖ, τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς αὐτὴν μεταδιώκει· ἀλλ' ὅψις μὲν ἐρεῖ χρωμάτων, ἀκοὴ δὲ ἀκουστών· οὕτω καὶ νοῦς νοητὰ ὁρεῖ, καὶ νοητῶν ἀκούει.—*Maximus Tyrius.*

his senses ; for all his shifts and doublings plainly come to this at last. He would have his senses possess the faculty of discerning spirit ; a faculty apart from their nature, and perhaps so absolutely inconsistent with it, as to be beyond the power, even of Omnipotence, to produce from any organization of matter. It is fit, that he, who thus requires impossibilities for his conviction, should play fast and loose with that evidence which he possesses ; that he should believe he has a body, and deny that he has a soul, upon evidence wholly similar and perfectly equivalent. But to be consistent, even in his inconsistency, he ought, upon the same principles, to deny that he has a body, by reason that he can neither smell its extension, nor hear its solidity. Plain men who can see no beauty in these fantastical vagaries, believe according as their consciousness, and as their senses inform them. All are cognizant of the same facts ; the inference which they supply is simple, and easy as the most common piece of household ratiocination. It is therefore against all probability to suppose, that it is not drawn aright.

Having thus endeavoured to prove that the ordinary experience of mankind is competent to decide this question, I proceed to shew,

II. *That it has actually decided it against Materialism.*

I shall first clear the way, by removing an objection sometimes urged against this species of evidence.

Man, it is contended, is always liable to error, and especially in cases where his wishes and interests coincide with his opinions. It was long universally believed, and the majority of mankind still believe, that the earth is at rest, and the sun in motion. The example of this universal error ought to make us distrust in other cases, arguments drawn from common consent.

I am aware that arguments drawn from the common consent of mankind, are not in all cases of equal force. Whether common consent shall be good evidence, or no evidence at all, depends on the nature of the case. “With respect,” says an ingenious writer, “to such opinions as are the result
“ of the most simple reflection, and analogous to the customary inferences of mankind in the common occurrences of
“ life, it seems to me that their general adoption is a con-

“clusive proof of their truth, such opinions being only an
 “extension on speculative subjects, of the general argument
 “from uniform and universal experience, and in other cases
 “the result of the genuine and unvarying moral sentiments
 “of mankind.”*

The instance mentioned above, affords perhaps as strong ground of objection, as can be taken against the authority of common consent; and no sufficient answer could probably be made to it, provided it were analogous to the case before us. But no analogy exists between the two cases. The acknowledged error in the one, will not therefore warrant our suspecting a like error in the other.

The error respecting the solar motion, regarded an external and distant object. To remove it, and establish the contrary truth, demanded a long series of sagacious and careful observations, such as few have the opportunity, and fewer still the ability, to institute. Trains of reasoning were required, so elaborate, acute, and comprehensive, as must ever be numbered with the most astonishing efforts of human intellect. In this case, the wonder is, not that men should have fallen into error; but that they should ever have been able to discover the truth. Men are not created astronomical, but moral beings, and there is no inconsistency in supposing, that although they should err universally, concerning every external object, they might still possess just and clear conceptions of truths intimately related to the constitution of their moral nature, and to the presumed end of their being.

The opinion regarding the human soul is formed, as I have already remarked, by that soul concerning itself; an object always necessarily present, and necessarily known in all its operations. It is a simple induction made from the observation of properties, like others which we are accustomed to make every day we live; but with this peculiar advantage, that every possible property is known; known, *because* it exists, and known, *as* it actually exists. Reality and appearances are here identical. The soul is beheld by herself, as the planetary motions would be displayed to an eye, placed at the centre of the solar system. A persuasion derived from such means of knowledge, attained by an easy and simple exercise of intellect, universally entertained, and

* Kirwan's Logic.

fondly cherished, as a truth dear and valuable beyond expression, stands as an axiom in the science of mind, and possesses all the weight and dignity of a first principle. "Nec verò id collocutio hominum aut consensus efficit: non institutis opinio est confirmata, non legibus: omni autem in re consensio omnium gentium, lex naturæ putanda est."*

The belief in a continued existence after death, seems to be as natural to man, as speech or thought. Indeed, it appears utterly impossible for a thinking being to form any conception of its own non-entity. Accordingly, we find that a belief in the immortality of the soul has prevailed throughout the world among savage tribes, not less than in civilized nations, from the earliest records of time. The belief that the soul exists after death, implies, that they who entertain it believe also, that man is a compound being; that the principle in which thought resides, is different in nature from the body, and is capable of an independent exercise of its peculiar powers. The rudest savage of the wilderness, however low we may estimate his intellectual faculties, cannot be supposed incapable of distinguishing between things so widely different, as thought and motivity are, from a putrefying carcase. However vague and indistinct his notions may be; although, in the simplicity of his heart, he may figure to himself,

"Behind the cloud-topt hill an humbler heaven,"

he clearly knows, that the persons whom he supposes still to enjoy existence in that happy region are not those identical bodies which he has just committed to the earth, or consumed in the flames; whose fragments the wild beasts have torn, the waters have wafted on their bosom, or the winds have dispersed through the air. The notions entertained by the savage, and by the multitude even in civilized countries, concerning the soul, are assuredly very different, as may well be expected, from the refined abstractions of the subtle metaphysician. Whoever recollects the tales of ghosts and spectres which alternately pleased and terrified him in early youth, and who calls to mind the pictures which fancy delineated of those airy beings, will have an exact and lively representation of what the bulk of the common people, in all countries, imagine the soul to be, in its state of separate ex-

* Cic. Tuscul. lib. i. c. 13.

istence. A thin, ærial, shadowy, sort of being; retaining the form, the features, and all other distinguishing marks of its corporeal tenement; but intangible, impassive, invisible at pleasure, permeating with ease the most solid bodies, and transporting itself from place to place with astonishing celerity. Absurd as these, and all similar notions of the disembodied spirit must appear to the philosophic eye, they nevertheless evince incontestably, that they who entertain them believe, that thought resides in something distinct from the body; and that this something, after the body is dissolved, continues to live, think, and act, with even greater vigour, and more intense vitality.

That this opinion of the nature and immortality of the soul is truly as universal as here represented, I shall substantiate by some examples, selected from the multitudes which abound in both ancient and modern writers. They are the more valuable and decisive, because most of them arise incidentally, and are delivered by authors who had no system to uphold. The reader to whom these are familiar, will recollect, that to others they may be new: and reflecting on the importance of the subject, he will not despise as trifling whatever tends to elucidate or confirm it. The oak, he will remember, owes its strength to the union of thread-like fibres, and minute particles of water compose the bow, which spans the horizon with its gigantic arch of light.

I shall begin with those ancient books which we are accustomed to regard with a peculiar reverence; but I begin with them merely on account of their antiquity. I cite them for the purpose of establishing a bare historical fact, and shall consequently refer to them as to any ordinary historian of credit. That these Hebrew records of the early transactions of mankind do really possess this lower degree of authority, I presume will not be questioned; and for the present purpose this degree is sufficient.

The author of the book of Genesis relates, that man was created in the image, and after the likeness of God. [Genes. c. i. v. 26.] It will not be supposed that Moses meant to assert that the human body is the image of God; and still less, that a mere property or function of that body constituted that image. If this meaning cannot be reasonably attached to the passage, the only other intelligible sense which it

will admit is, that, according to the opinion of Moses, man resembles his Creator so far only as he is an intelligent and immortal spirit.

In Genesis, ch. xxv. ver. 8, we read, “Then Abraham gave up the ghost—and was gathered to his people.” A careless perusal of this passage might lead us to suppose its meaning to be, that Abraham was buried with his fathers. But this cannot be the sense of it. The ancestors of Abraham lived, and died, and were buried in Mesopotamia, the country from which Abraham emigrated; but he was buried in the land of Canaan, in the cave of Macpelah. The only other interpretation which the passage will easily admit of is, that Abraham was united to his forefathers in the world of departed spirits. In this sense the word “gathered” is used in other passages of the Scriptures, particularly in *Job*, ch. xxvii. ver. 19, and *Isaiah*, ch. xlix. ver. 5.

It may be collected from these two passages, that the doctrine of the immortality and separate existence of the soul was known in Western Asia upwards of 3200 years ago: the death of Moses being fixed in our common chronologies to the year 1451 before Christ.

In a subsequent age, we find king Saul having recourse to the arts of necromancy. When Samuel appeared to him, he addressed him thus: “God is departed from me,—therefore I have called thee up, that thou mayest make known unto me what I shall do.”—*Sam.* book 1. ch. xxviii. ver. 15.

Saul did not desire to bring up from the grave the decaying bones of Samuel, nor did he imagine that they could understand his application, and assist him with information and advice. It was then of Samuel’s spirit that he was anxious to inquire. Previous to this occurrence, the pretenders to necromancy had multiplied to such an extent as to occasion their being driven out of the country as a public nuisance. Of course, that tenet which was the foundation of their delusive art, must have been common amongst the people.

In those beautiful compositions of Solomon, the books entitled *Ecclesiastes* and *Wisdom*, the following passages occur:—

“Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was, and

the spirit shall return unto God, who gave it."—*Eccles.* ch. xii. ver. 7.

"For the ungodly said, reasoning with themselves, but not aright, The breath in our nostrils is as smoke, and a little spark in the moving of our heart. Which, being extinguished, our body shall be turned into ashes, and our spirit shall vanish as the soft air. . . . Such things they did imagine, and were deceived. . . . For God created man to be immortal, and made him to be an image of his own eternity."—*Wisdom*, ch. ii. ver. 1—23.

These two passages place beyond dispute the state of the doctrine in the time of Solomon. The chapter, of which the latter forms a part, conveys also in very unequivocal terms, the opinion which the philosophic king entertained of Materialists. In those early times the "ungodly" persuaded themselves, as an encouragement to vice, that thought was merely "breath, and a little spark in the moving of the heart." Now, in these our days, "thought is a function of the brain, produced in the same way as bile is secreted by the liver." Thus do extremes meet: thus do ancient Ignorance and modern *Illumination* "kiss each other."

The author of the "Acts of the Apostles," writing upwards of a thousand years after the death of Solomon, informs us that "the Sadducees say that there is no resurrection, neither angels nor spirits: but the Pharisees confess both."—ch. xxiii. ver. 8.

The Sadducees were a very insignificant sect, in point of numbers. The doctrine of the Pharisees was the general tenet of the people.—Vide *Prideaux's Connection*.

Josephus [*De Bell. Jud.* l.iii. c. 14.] puts into the mouth of Joseph, a leader of the Jews, an express declaration of the spiritual nature and immortality of the soul, which he urges to his followers as an argument for contempt of death.

The separate existence and immortality of the soul may thus be traced as a doctrine received amongst the Hebrew race, at least from the death of Moses to the destruction of Jerusalem, a period of more than 1500 years. It still continues to be maintained by the Jews, now dispersed through all the countries of the earth.

The Egyptians, says Herodotus, were the first who taught

the doctrine that the souls of men are immortal. “Πρῶτοι δὲ καὶ τόνδε τὸν λόγον Αἰγύπτιοί ἐσι οἱ εἰπόντες, ὡς ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ ἀθάνατός ἐστι.”—*Euterpe*, cap. 123. It need scarcely be remarked, that the historian errs in ascribing the origin of this doctrine to the Egyptians. That it was received amongst them at the time he wrote, was, however, a fact perfectly within his reach. To that extent his testimony is conclusive, which is all that concerns the present question.—Vide *Diod. Sicul.* lib. i.

Jamblichus, in his book *De Mysteriis Ægyptiorum*, asserts that the doctrine of the immateriality and immortality of the soul, was declared in the most explicit manner in those ancient writings ascribed to the Egyptian Mercury, and which were preserved by the priests with the utmost care, as records containing all the arcana of their theology. According to those writings, man possesses two souls, one of which partakes of the nature of the prime intelligence, and the energy of the Demiurgus; the other is derived from the æther, or visible heavens. “Δυό γάρ ἔχει ψυχὰς, ὡς ταῦτά φησι τὰ γράμματα, ὁ ἄνθρωπος· καὶ ἡ μὲν ἐστὶν ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου νοητοῦ μετέχουσα καὶ τῆς τοῦ δημιουργοῦ δυνάμεως, ἡ δὲ ἐνδιδομένη ἐκ τῆς τῶν οὐρανίων περιφορᾶς. κ. τ. λ.—Sect. viii. c. 6.

The ancient Getæ and Trausi, wild and savage nations, probably of Scythian origin, believed that the spirits of the dead enjoyed immortal life, in the presence of their divinity Zamolxis. “Ἀθανατίζουσι δὲ τόνδὲ τὸν τρόπον (*Getæ sc.*) οὔτε ἀποθνήσκειν ἐωυτοὺς νομίζουσι, ἵεναι τε τὸν ἀπολλύμενον παρὰ Ζάμολξιν δαίμονα.”—*Herodot. Melpom.* c. 94. *necnon Terps.* c. 4.

The numerous tribes known under the general name of Thracians, entertained the same, or similar, notions. “Alii redituras putant animas obeuntium . . . alii etsi non redeant, non extinguunt tamen, sed ad beatiora transire.”—*Mela de Sit. Orb.* lib. ii. c. 2.

The Aborigines of Italy, as we learn from Cicero, believed that the existence of man continued after death. The emphatic word (*insitum*) which he uses, seems to imply, that this tenet was deeply rooted, and extensively spread amongst them. “Unum illud erat *insitum* priscis illis quos *Cascos* appellat Ennius, esse in morte sensum, nec excessu vitæ, sic deleri hominem ut funditus interiret.”—*Tuscul.* lib. i. c. 13.

Every one not wholly illiterate, knows that the mythology of Greece and Rome had its judges of the dead, its Tartarus and Elysium. These fables were the creed of the multitude. The principles which lay at the root of them, purified and illustrated by philosophy, were, with few exceptions, received by all the most eminent men of those nations. Even the wild notions which some of the ancient philosophers broached concerning the nature of the soul, prove that all of them felt an insuperable difficulty in conceiving it akin to the perishable body. From this master-absurdity, they gladly took refuge in any minor extravagance, and called in to their assistance the elements in every combination, the harmony of sounds, and the properties of numbers. The authorities which might be brought forward under this head are innumerable. The few following are all which the limits of this disquisition permit me to adduce; but those few will sufficiently exhibit the uniformity with which the same doctrine was maintained in ages very distant from each other.

Homer distinctly mentions the separate existence of the soul. We may infer that the doctrine was familiar in his age, from his alluding to it in that incidental manner, in which we are accustomed to speak of a notorious and undisputed fact.

The shade of Patroclus thus addresses Achilles :—

Τῆλέ με εἶργούσι ψυχὰι, εἶδ' ὧλα καμόντων,
Οὐδέ με πως μίσησθαι ὑπὲρ ποταμοῦ ἑῶσιν.

— — — — —
καί μοι δὲς τὴν χεῖρ——

— — — — —
Ὡς ἄρα φωνήσας ὠρέξατο χερσὶ φίλησιν,
οὐδ' ἔλαβε· ψυχὴ δὲ κατὰ χθονὸς ἤνυτε καπνός,
ὦχετο τετρηγυῖα.—*Il.* l. 23. v. 72—99.

Let my pale corse the rites of burial know,
And give me entrance in the realms below.
Till then the spirit finds no resting place,
But here and there th' unbody'd spectres chase
The vagrant dead around the dark abode,
Forbid to cross th' irremeable flood.

— — — — —
Now give thy hand,

— — — — —
He said, and with his longing arms essay'd,
In vain, to grasp the visionary shade;

Like a thin smoke, he sees the spirit fly,
And hears a feeble, lamentable cry.—*Pope's Transl.*

Ulysses says of the shade of Hercules:—

Τον δὲ μέτ' εἰσενόησα ἑῖν' Ἡρακλεΐην,
Εἶδ' ὦλον· αὐτὸς δὲ μετ' ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσι
τέρπεται.—*Odys.* l. 11. v. 600.

Now I the strength of Hercules behold,
A tow'ring spectre of gigantic mould,
A shadowy form! for high in heaven's abodes,
Himself resides, a god among the gods.—*Pope's Transl.*

In these two passages the poet asserts the separate existence of the soul, and its shadowy incorporeal nature, in the most direct and unequivocal terms. Callimachus, in a beautiful epitaph, thus speaks of the dead:—

Τῇδε Σάων ὁ Δίκωνος Ἀκανθίος ἔξον ὕπνον
Κοιμᾶται, θνησκεῖν μὴ λεγε τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς.

Thus far the poets. Let us now hear the philosophers of antiquity on this subject.

Τῷ μὲν θείῳ καὶ ἀθανάτῳ καὶ νοητῷ καὶ μονοειδεῖ, καὶ ἀδιαλύτῳ καὶ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ κατὰ ταυτὰ ἔχοντι ἑαυτῷ ὁμοιότατον εἶναι ψυχὴν·

Ipsi quidem divino, immortalī, intelligentiā prædīto, simplici, indissolubili, semperque æquabiliter et eodem sibi modo se ipsum habenti, animum esse simillimum.—*Plato in Phæd.* c. 28.

Παντὸς μᾶλλον ἄρα, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, ψυχὴ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀνώλεθρον· καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἔσονται ἡμῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ ἐν ἄδου. Itaque maximè omnium, inquit, Cebes, anima immortalis et interitus expers est; eruntque reverà apud inferos animæ nostræ.—*Idem. in ibid.* c. 56.

Ἦν δ' ἀπολείψας σῶμα ἐς αἰθέρ' ἐλεύθερον ἔλθεις,
Ἔσσεαι ἀθάνατος θεὸς ἄμβροτος, οὐκ ἔτι θνητός.

Quod si relicto corpore ad liberam æthera perveneris,
Eris immortalis Deus incorruptibilis, nec amplius mortalis.

Pythagoræ Aur. Carm. v. 70.

“Εἰ μὲν οὖν τοιοῦτον ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ οἶον καὶ τὸ σῶμα, θνητὸν καὶ φθειρόμενον καὶ λυόμενον καὶ σηπόμενον, οὐδὲν ἔχω περὶ αὐτῆς σεμνὸν εἰπεῖν·——εἰ τοιοῦτον ἡ ψυχὴ, οὔτε τι οἶδε οὐδέ

ἀναμινύσκεται, οὔτε μανθάνει· Θᾶπτον γὰρ ἄν φυλάξαι σφραγίδος τυπούς κηρὸς ὑπὸ ἡλίου τηκόμενος, ἢ ψυχὴ μάθημα, εἰπὲρ ἔστι σῶμα. κ. τ. α.”

Quod si corpori similis sit anima, morti videlicet obnoxia et corruptioni; si dissolvatur et putrescat magnificè de eâ loqui verear.—Si talis sit animus, nec scire quicquam nec reminisci poterit nec discere. Facilius enim cera sole liquefacta impressam sigilli imaginem servaret, quam disciplinam animus, si quidem sit corpus.—*Maximus Tyrius Dissert.* 28.

“Quod si omnium consensus naturæ vox est: omnesque qui ubique sunt, consentiunt esse aliquid, quod ad eos pertinere, qui è vitâ cesserint, nobis quoque idem existimandum est.—*Cic. Tuscul.* lib. i. c. 15.

“Tu verò enitere, et sic habeto, *Non esse te mortalem, sed corpus hoc.*”—*Id. Somn. Scip.*

“Quid enim aliud est animus, quam quodammodò se habens spiritus?”—*Senec. Epist.* 50.

“Cum venerit illa dies quæ mixtum hoc divini humanique secernet, corpus hoc ubi inveni, relinquam; ipse me diis reddam”—*Id. Epist.* 102.

“Habere nos animum, cujus imperio et impellimur et revocamur, omnes fatebuntur.”—*Id. Nat. Quæst.* lib. vii. § 24.

Even Pliny, himself a materialist, bears testimony to the universal belief in the soul's immortality, whilst in the very act of arguing against it. He says, “aliàs immortalitatem animæ, aliàs transfigurationem, aliàs sensum inferis dando et manes colendo, deumque faciendo qui jam etiam homo esse desierit.”—*Nat. Hist.* lib. vii. c. 55.

Arnobius, a Christian author, and of course directly opposed in sentiment to Pliny, concurs with him on this particular. Addressing the Pagans, he says, “Ipse denique animus qui immortalis et Deus vobis esse narratur, &c.”—*Arnob. Adv. Gentes.* lib. ii.

The learned and accurate Macrobius, after giving a long list of the various opinions entertained by the ancient philosophers, concerning the essence of the soul, ends the catalogue with this remark: “Obtinuit tamen non minùs de incorporalitate ejus quàm de immortalitate sententia.”—*Macrobius De Somn. Scip. Comm.* lib. i. c. 14.

Here I shall close these authorities, drawn from the Greek and Roman writers; already I fear, extended to a wear-

some length. Like one of those starry *nebulæ*, which the astronomer discovers in the depths of space, this galaxy of poets and philosophers transmit, from afar, their blended and friendly light, piercing through the dark ages of a remote antiquity.

If we turn our eyes to the north, and west of Europe; and survey the Gothic and Celtic nations, comprising along with the ancient inhabitants of Sweden, Norway, and Iceland; the Gauls, the Belgæ, the Germans, the Iberians, and the *indigenæ* of the British Islands; we shall find the same opinions pervading their icy coasts and illimitable forests, which we met in the temples of Thebes, and the porticoes of Athens.

All the ancient authors who mention the Celtic nations, concur in representing them as holding the doctrine of a future state. Cæsar, who resided among them during many years, and who was certainly acquainted intimately with their customs and opinions, says of the Druids, “In primis hoc volunt persuadere; non interire animas.”—*De Bell. Gall.* lib. vi. “Disciplina in Britannia reperta atque inde in Galliam translata esse existimatur: et nunc qui diligentius eam rem cognoscere volunt, plerumque illò discendi causâ proficiscuntur.”—*Id.*

To the same purpose Mela says, “Unum ex his quæ præcipiunt (*Druidæ*) in vulgus effluxit, videlicet ut forent ad bella meliores, æternas esse animas.”—*De Sit. Orb.* l. iii. c. 2. Hence it appears, that this doctrine was not a mystery reserved for the initiated, but was a popular tenet, inculcated with earnestness and universally diffused amongst the inhabitants of ancient Gaul and Britain. Corresponding accounts of the druidical religion are given by *Strabo*, l. iv. and by *Ammian. Marcell. Hist.* l. xv. Lucan has a spirited passage to the same effect:

————— Vobis auctoribus, umbræ
Non tacitas Erebi sedes, Ditisque profundi
Pallida regna petunt: Regit idem spiritus artus
Orbe alio: longæ (canitis si cognita) vitæ
Mors media est —*Phars. lib. i. v. 454.*

Amongst the Hyperboræan nations, a comparatively pure system of religion and a belief in the immortality of the soul appear to have prevailed, long before the arrival of Odin in the north. [Vid. Bartholin. de Causis Contempt. a Dan. Gentil. mortis, lib. 2.] The religion of Odin, and the other

gods of the Edda, embraced, as is well known, the separate existence of souls, and assigned the Valhalla and Niflheim, for their abode, during their intermediate state, which was to last until the final destruction of Loke, and the conflagration of the world. “Notwithstanding the obscurities “ found in these descriptions, we see that it was a doctrine “ rendered sacred by the religion of the ancient Scandinavians, that the soul was immortal All the Gothic “ and Celtic nations held the same opinions, &c.”—*Mallet’s Northern Antiquities*.

The testimony of Olaüs Magnus, is explicit to the same effect. Speaking of the rites and sacrifices of the Goths, he says, “Enimverò sic defunctos non omninò mori, sed tam illos quam se ipsos (*Gothos*) immortales esse, persuasum habebant.”—*Gent. Septentr. Hist.* lib. iii. c. 6.

The Eddas, in which, as I need scarcely observe, are collected the ancient mythological opinions of the northern nations, abound with passages distinctly asserting the immortal nature of the soul. I shall produce two only, but those two are decisive.

In the first fable of the Islandic Edda, intitled “Questions of Gangler,” is this passage: “Thridi proceeds, He hath done more; he hath made man, and given him a spirit or soul, which shall live, even after the body shall have mouldered away.”

“Tunc loquebatur Tertius: (Islandicè, Thridi.) Hoc quod majus est, quam quod fabricabat hominem, et dabat ei spiritum, qui vivet; licet corpus evanuerit.”—*Suigotorum et Normandorum Edda Op. et Studio Joh. Goranson*.

Corpus ejus abstraxerunt
In latentem semitam
Et frustatim dissectum in puteum dejecerunt

* * * * *

Animam ejus invitavit domum
Verus ille Deus
In sua gaudia immigrare.

Solar-Liðo. Stanz. 7.

Edda antiquior seu Sæmundina Hafnia. 1787.

Descending again to the south, we find the ancient Persians, under the religion of Zerdûst, entertaining very exalted notions of the Deity, and also of the nature and destiny of man, as may be seen at large in the *Zund Avesta* and the *Sad-der*. With respect to their belief in the im-

mortality of the soul, the testimony of the learned Hyde is full and explicit. "Quoad medium statum; credunt defunctorum piorum animas esse apud Deum, aliorum alicubi, usque ad resurrectionem, in quâ corporibus vestitæ, per pontem (ubi sunt angeli custodes) tentabunt transitum in terram felicitatis."—*Hist. Relig. Vet. Pers.* cap. 33.

Proceeding eastward, we discover the same tenet every where prevailing, throughout the vast countries inhabited by the Hindû race. The unity and immortality of the soul are asserted in a very remarkable manner in the *Baghvat Geeta*, a book written in the Sanskreet language, as it is said, above four thousand years ago, and which is esteemed by the Brahmins to contain all the grand mysteries of their religion. The following passages, extracted from that work, require no comment.

"These bodies which envelope the souls which inhabit them, which are eternal, incorruptible, and surpassing all conception, are declared to be finite beings."—*Page 36.*

"The man who believeth that it is the soul which killeth, and he who thinketh that the soul may be destroyed, are both alike deceived."—*Ibid.*

"The weapon divideth it not, the fire burneth it not, the wind drieth it not away; it is indivisible, inconsumable, incorruptible, and is not to be dried away: it is eternal, universal, permanent, immoveable; it is invisible, inconceivable, and unalterable."—*Page 37. Baghvat Geeta, translated by Wilkins.*

[See more to the same purpose in the *Ayeen Akbery*, vol. 3. *passim.*]

In China, the immortality of the soul is believed generally by the people. Its incorporeal nature is strongly maintained by the sect of the Tao-See; in ancient times the most considerable and influential in the empire. For these facts we are indebted to the learned and indefatigable Amiot, who resided as a missionary amongst the Chinese during many years, and from whose letters, as they appear in the "*Memoires des Chinois*," the following extracts are taken:

"La religion de Fo est la religion dominante du peuple.
* * * Les Bonzes (the priests of Fo) enseignent qu'après la mort il y a des recompenses pour la vertu, des punitions

pour le crime ; que c'est au Dieu Fo qu'ils doivent l'expiation de leur pèchés et une nouvelle naissance à laquelle ils sont destinés dans l'autre monde."—*Memoires des Chinois Tom. 5.*

The sect of the Tao-See regard the soul as composed of two parts or principles. One of these, which they term *Ling*, is the seat of the intellectual powers, the other and inferior part, named *Houen*, is the abode of the passions. "Tant," says Amiot in his account of the doctrines of this sect, "Tant que les parties constitutives de cet être mixte sont unies et forment un tout, ce tout est un homme, mais quand les liens qui les unissoient ensemble sont rompus par l'altération, la corruption, ou la dissolution de celles qui composoient le corps, il cesse d'être ce qu'il étoit, sans cependant cesser d'exister. Le corps formé des parties les plus grossières rentre dans la classe des principes dont il étoit émané pour servir de sujet à d'autres formes. Le *Ling* et le *Houen*, formés des parties les plus subtiles demeurent unis et font un être à part, qui prend différentes dénominations suivant le rang qu'il occupe dans la classe générale des êtres ; et ce rang lui est assigné par le *Tien* (the Supreme Being) en recompense ou en punition de l'usage bon ou mauvais qu'il aura fait de ses facultés lorsqu'il étoit compté parmi les hommes."—*Memoires des Chinois, Tom. 15. Lettre d'Amiot écrite de Peking le 16 Oct. 1787, sur la Secte des Tao-Sée.*

From this eastern extremity of Asia, if we pass to the third great division of the globe, we shall find that amongst the numerous nations of Africa, a belief in a future state and in the existence of incorporeal natures has been ascertained to prevail wherever sufficient opportunities of inquiry have been afforded. This is notoriously the case where Mahometanism prevails, as it does entirely, throughout the north and north-eastern regions of the continent, and generally, amongst the wandering hordes of the desert. The negroes of Guinea, according to Bosman, think that after death, they are wafted over a certain river into another world, in which they are punished or rewarded according to their conduct in the present life. The negroes who inhabit the interior of the country, believe that far inland, towards the rising sun, there dwells a powerful Priest or *Feticheer*,

as they call him, before whom the dead are conveyed to receive judgment and retribution.—*Bosman's Guinea Lett.* 10. Mr. Barrow, in his account of Caffraria, mentions an incident which evinces that a belief in the post-existence and agency of the dead occupies a very prominent place in the minds of the people of that country. During an interview with a Caffre chief, he says, “I then shewed him my watch, and from his great surprise it was evident he had never seen one before. On examining attentively the movements, and observing that the motion was continued in his own hands, he looked at the surrounding spectators and pronounced the word *feegas*, which *was echoed back by a nod of the head from the whole crowd*. Concerning this word the Hottentot interpreter could get no other information, than that it was some influence of the dead over the living, in instigating and directing the actions of the latter.”—*Barrow's Journey*, vol. 1.

These simple people looked upon a watch with all the amazement which, in more civilized nations, would be produced by some transcendant display of supernatural power. It brought to their minds, at once, the most mysterious thing they were acquainted with; namely, the agency of the dead. The ready exclamation of the chief, and the assenting gesture of the crowd, indicate that notion to be familiar and general amongst them.

As regards the New World, I must very briefly presume on the patience of the reader. The following authorities, although concise, are complete and decisive.

“We can trace this opinion (the immortality of the soul) from one extremity of America to the other; in some regions more faint and obscure, in others more perfectly developed, but no where unknown. The most uncivilized of its savage tribes do not apprehend death as the extinction of being.”—(*Robertson's America*, book 4.)

“Whenever we asked them (the Sandwich islanders), whither the dead were gone, we were always answered, that the breath, which they appeared to consider as the soul, or immortal part, was gone to the *Eatooa*; and on pushing our inquiries farther, they seemed to describe some particular place, where they imagined the abode of the deceased to be.”—(*Captain King's Journal*.)

“The people of the Society Islands believe the soul to be both immaterial and immortal. They say it keeps fluttering about the lips during the pangs of death, and that then it ascends and mixes with, or as they express it, is eaten by the Deity. * * * * They consider this coalition with the Deity, as a kind of purification necessary to be undergone before they enter into a state of bliss.”—(*Cook's Voyage*, 1776—1780.)

[See likewise “*First Missionary Voyage*, 1796—1798.”]

Thus have we made the circuit of the globe, exploring the opinions of mankind, on this momentous question, from the earliest dawn of history to the present times. And now let the Materialist make his appeal to experience, if he will. Here, the genuine dictates of experience are displayed, with a clearness not to be mistaken, and a force which it is impossible to resist or elude. This is the universal result of the observations, which men have made upon themselves. Every where the persuasion exists, that man is something else besides this perishable body; all, with one consenting voice, proclaim him the heir of immortality. “*Ταῦτα δὲ ὁ Ἕλλην λέγει καὶ ὁ βάρβαρος λέγει, καὶ ὁ Ἡπειρώτης, καὶ ὁ Θαλάττιος καὶ ὁ σοφὸς καὶ ὁ ἄσοφος.*”* The ancient and the modern, the learned and the illiterate, the polished native of civilized countries, the wild hunters of the forest, the lonely islanders of the remotest ocean; from the equator to the frozen regions of the pole, men of all ages, climates, kindreds, religions, and habits, differing from each other in all things else, are, in this one, unanimous. If then accumulated facts, if the inductions of reason, if universal consent avail in any case, to establish any principle, any law of nature whatever; they here concur with the fullest effect, to class that tendency of the mind to regard itself as an immaterial and immortal being, in the rank of a primary law of human nature; a law, emanating necessarily from the original constitution of man, and second to none in the strength of its influence, and the importance of its consequences.

Having thus considered the appeal which the lecturer makes to experience, I shall briefly examine the succeeding clause of his proposition, wherein he asserts, “That the

* Max. Tyr. Diss. 1.

constant conjunction of phenomena, is the sole ground for affirming a necessary connexion between them."

A *necessary* connexion between events or appearances, is a mode of expression which one would hardly expect to meet with in a philosophical disquisition. The relations which connect together things of the same or of different kinds, can be properly termed *necessary*, only when the existence of the things related, is so absolutely inseparable as that we are unable to conceive them existing apart from each other. Thus, we say with propriety, that extension and space are necessarily related; that Infinite Wisdom necessarily prefers what upon the whole is best; for it is impossible to imagine space apart from extension, or Infinite Wisdom choosing unwisely. But the relation between phenomena, such for example as those standing in the relation of cause and effect, cannot be termed necessary, in the abstract philosophic sense of the word. The cause and its effect are merely two insulated facts, which occur in a certain order. That order is referable only to the will of a directing intelligence, and not to a necessity springing from the nature of the facts themselves. This, however, is not the place for a lengthened discussion of this question; yet, in preparing to examine a philosophical proposition, it seemed not improper to notice this inaccuracy, perhaps inadvertency, in its enunciation.

The above proposition, if taken alone, declares simply, that the existence of a connexion between the mind and the body is to be inferred from the correspondence of their respective phenomena. But, when viewed, as we must in fairness view it, in conjunction with the whole argument of which it forms a part, its intention evidently is, to fix the nature of that connexion, and to shew, in fact, that the brain and thought are related to each other, as cause and effect. That a very close and intimate connexion subsists between the soul and the body, was never, I suppose, doubted by any who admitted the existence of both; nor that the conjunction of their respective phenomena sufficiently evidences that connexion. But, to define the relation in which they stand towards each other, and whether it be a relation of cause and effect, is a widely different question, and one which the evidence, that may very well prove simply a con-

nexion between them, falls short of determining. The soul and body reciprocally influence each other, and hence arises a satisfactory proof, that they are closely related together ; but how that reciprocal influence is to be drawn into a proof of the existence, or non-existence of either of them ; or how it can thence be shewn, that one of them is a mere effect or function of the other, I confess myself at a loss to understand. What, I desire to know, would be thought of a philosopher, who should dream of deducing the nature and origin of the planets, from the disturbing forces which they exert upon one another ; or who should affirm that the moon was the cause of the ocean, and allege as a proof of it, the influence which she exercises upon its waters, and the remarkable correspondence of their respective phenomena ? Exactly in the predicament of such a philosopher, is the Materialist who argues that thought is a function of matter, because the intellectual powers are affected and modified by changes in the state and circumstances of the body. Besides, it is well known, that the health and condition of the body are powerfully acted upon by the passions and affections of the mind. So, the same argument which the Materialist uses, to prove thought a function of matter, will serve the immaterialist, to prove matter a function, or if you will, an emanation of thought. The value of an argument, which may thus be used, with equal plausibility, on opposite sides of the same question, it is not hard to determine.

But what, in fact, is the amount of those conjunct phenomena, which Materialists refer us to, as proving, in their opinion, the connexion between matter and thought ? Every man, they allege, has a brain ; every man has also intellectual powers. “ No intellectual operation has ever been seen, “ except in conjunction with a brain.”—(*Lect.* 4. p. 96.) But, we reply, every man has likewise a heart, and lungs, ears and eyes. The brain grows, (*Vid. Lect.* 4. p. 94.) and at the same time the mental powers expand and strengthen. But, the other viscera, the entire body grows contemporaneously, as well as the brain. Some injuries of the brain will destroy life, and the phenomena of mind cease to be apparent. But those phenomena will cease, upon other injuries of equivalent potency affecting any other vital organ. Again ; certain other injuries of the brain will produce insensibility or madness. But, pain suffered through many

other highly sensitive organs, and carried to a certain degree of intensity, will affect the mind in like manner. Thus we might rehearse a catalogue of phenomena, to the same purpose; but those here mentioned are a fair specimen of the whole. All which I at least have ever read of, or have heard urged by Materialists, are *ejusdem farinae*. From the conjunction of these and such like phenomena, they infer that the brain thinks. But from what has been said, it is tolerably clear, that by the same method of reasoning, we may shew that other organs, as well as the brain, nay, that every particle of matter in the whole body is cogitative. The Materialist will hardly deny that this corollary is absurd: it is, however, strictly deducible from his main proposition, which must, therefore, be absurd likewise.

At page 92, and again at page 97, the author declares himself unable to assign any adequate function to the brain, if thought be not its function. I have observed, that to a keen-scented philosopher, who makes it the business of his life to track nature through all her doublings and windings, nothing is more grievously vexatious, than to confess himself at fault. He seems to think it incumbent on him, to explain every thing. When the physiologist comes to treat of the brain, what, thinks he, can I say of this viscus? If I say that only which I know, my account will be meagre indeed: I will therefore set forward an hypothesis, behind which my ignorance may lie at ease; and even if it do not suit very well, at least it will answer until a better shall be found.

The difficulty which oppresses the Lecturer's mind, is to devise a suitable function for the brain. It appears, then, that if any other tolerably plausible hypothesis could be struck out, his difficulty would be materially lessened. If it were an hypothesis for which about as much might be said, as for the material system, his only difficulty would be the difficulty of choosing. Placed between two hypotheses, like the ass of the schoolmen, between opposite and equal attractions; or, like Macheath, in the play, between rival beauties, he would exclaim,

How happy could I be with either,
Were t'other dear charmer away!

But for *one* hypothesis, at least, he feels a kind of natural

want, and in the absence of others, he desperately determines that the brain *shall* think.

But were the argument to turn on this point, I apprehend that it would not be so very impossible to suggest other offices which the brain may discharge, and those not devoid of some show of reason, nor yet inadequate to the curious structure and careful preservation of that organ. I would take the liberty to ask the Lecturer, with the humility which becomes one not professionally familiar with this subject, whether he is so perfectly acquainted with the nervous system, with all the important offices which it may discharge towards the maintenance of life, with the waste which must be occasioned by its incessant activity, as to be able to decide positively, that the brain, the central organ of the nervous system, as he himself terms it, is more than adequate to the supply of the nerves; especially, when it is considered, that they pervade every fibre of the body, and that their collective bulk must bear a very great proportion to the bulk of the brain. With this, I do not presume to assert, that the use of the brain is to supply and maintain the nervous system; I only ask the Lecturer, whether he can shew that such is not its use, and that it is impossible it should be so? If he cannot do this, he will confess, that adequate functions may be assigned to the brain, even though we deny thought to be its function. His words are, (p. 97.) “If the mental processes be not the function of the brain, what is its office?”—The brain, if it does not think, “has indeed the easiest lot in the animal economy: it is better fed, clothed, and lodged than any other part, and has less to do.” (p. 92.) Reduce this argument to syllogistic form, and it will stand thus:—

The brain is certainly of some use in the animal economy of man.

But I am ignorant of its use:

Therefore its use is to reason.

Truly, a singular specimen this, of logical incoherence!

The Lecturer now diverges to panegyrisé “Free Inquiry” (or, as it was called in the days of our fathers, Free-thinking), and to deprecate “fine hypotheses” and “specious theories.”

“Reason and free inquiry,” he proceeds, “are the only

effectual antidotes of error. Give them full scope, and they will uphold truth, by bringing false opinions, and all the spurious offspring of ignorance, prejudice, and self-interest, before their severe tribunal, and subjecting them to the test of close investigation. Error alone needs artificial support: truth can stand alone.”—p. 93.

It is something remarkable, that the writers of a particular class, styled by themselves “philosophers,” κατ’ ἐξοχὴν, whenever they deal with matters concerning religion, morals, politics, or even with such a question as the one here agitated, think it indispensable to apprize the world, that they, above all other men, are animated by an especial regard for truth, and that upon their sect only has the task devolved, of drawing her up from the well. For them, it seems, have been reserved the choice seats in the “*Sapientium templa serena* ;” they only, like the gods of Lucretius, occupy that calm and lofty station, where the storms of passion do not blow, and to which the mists of prejudice never ascend. They display themselves in showy colours, as the patrons of reason, and natural judges of error; and upon the score of these self-conferred dignities, they claim the privilege of being allowed to overturn either the religion or the government of their country, as best may please them. They are to be licensed to wander through the gardens of politics or morals, to defile the fountains, uproot the groves, and demolish the temples; whilst no law must forbid their entrance, or restrain their excesses. Why the writers of this stamp should so favour truth and reason with their gracious and peculiar patronage, is, I presume, in the hope of having it believed that between them there exists a near relationship and exclusive intimacy; just as some vain and silly people seek to swell their own consequence, by continually boasting of their acquaintance with the great. But, if we are to judge of the fact by the productions of very many of this school, it would seem that they deal with reason as Plato proposed to treat Homer. They bestow on her crowns and incense; and with abundance of smooth words and fine compliments, send her away, as the philosopher would have dismissed the poet from his imaginary commonwealth.

Neither can I discover any better ground for the claim which they make to unlimited freedom of discussion, when

treating hostilely of subjects, which the greater part of the society they live in are accustomed to reverence.

That reason is our only guide, and the sole judge of truth, is not to be questioned. That the knowledge of truth is always desirable, and is to be attained only by inquiry, is no less certain. Whilst any truth is either wholly concealed, or but partially developed, it appears not unreasonable that men should be permitted to search for it every where, and freely; since, until it be found, no one can say where it may lie concealed. But, in presuming that any given truth, or system of truths, is in its nature discoverable, we imply the possibility of a time arriving, in which it shall be fully known and firmly established. Let us suppose that time to have actually arrived. Suppose also that the truth in question is of great importance; that its maintenance conduces in a very high degree to the private happiness of individuals, and to the general welfare of the community. Suppose that authors arise who attack this truth, and labour to bring mankind back to their former state of distressful anxiety respecting it. For this purpose they employ, over again, all those reasonings which had previously been used against it, whilst it yet was doubtful; they studiously exclude the light which subsequent inquiry let in; they misstate facts, confuse principles; in a word, they resort to every artifice of disingenuous sophistry. By these means they contrive to disturb the opinions of great numbers; and if those opinions be such as affect the conduct of life, they unsettle, at the same time, their notions of right and wrong: shake their confidence in the rule by which they tried their actions, and, in the end, probably destroy their happiness, and with it the happiness of their families and connexions. Nor does the evil end here: depraved and wretched individuals never yet composed a virtuous and happy state. Public integrity and love of country cannot dwell in bosoms to which in private life honesty and benevolence are strangers. The poet, after reciting the rural virtues of ancient Italy, justly remarks,

——— Sic fortis Etruria crevit

Scilicet et rerum facta est pulcherrima Roma.

On the contrary, where private depravity prevails, the moral gangrene spreads from the extremities to the vital parts,

and the empire sinks beneath the aggregated vices of its members.

States are but families on a large scale : they proceed from the same origin, are governed by like principles, and analogous causes influence their prosperity and their decline. Would the head of a family discharge his duty if he placed in the hands of his children books having a tendency to mislead their understanding, and taint their character? Would it justify his conduct to any man of the plainest sense, were such a parent to plead the supremacy of reason, the advantages of free inquiry, the certainty that truth must triumph in the end ; were he to harangue of superiority to prejudice, enlightened views, and philosophic liberality? What the duty of a parent is in such a case, the same is the duty of the magistrate towards his larger family. A period arrives when the care of the parent is no longer requisite ; but in the present state of even the most civilized countries, immense numbers unfortunately remain children all their lives, with regard to matters which very nearly concern them. Over these it becomes the duty of the laws to watch with parental solicitude. Those laws defend the weak from the abuse of superior bodily strength ; ought they not, upon the same principle to restrain the abuse of superior intellect? They protect the property of the simple from the depredations of the swindler ; why not also guard the moral wealth of the illiterate from the frauds of the sophist? The illiterate, we shall be told, may collect books, may apply himself to study, and grow learned in controversy. I apprehend it would be deemed a poor excuse for one who had dug a secret pitfall, or set a spring-gun in the public road, to say that travellers are bound to take care of their steps, and to have their eyes about them. The bulk of mankind must ever hold many of their opinions upon authority ; and however true those opinions may be, they will ever want the leisure, the learning, the ability, and perhaps the inclination, thoroughly to examine and appreciate the evidences of their truth. Still it may nearly interest them to retain those opinions ; and in proportion to that interest is the criminality of those writers who attempt to undermine them, especially by a disingenuous abuse of their superior learning and talents.

It will be acknowledged that, in the freest community

imaginable, no man would be suffered to inculcate as lawful and commendable, the commission of crimes generally accounted fearful and odious. The general feelings of mankind would be enlisted against such an abuse of liberty, and demonstrating the necessity, would establish the principle of restraint. In extreme cases no difficulty is felt ; it begins only when we come to inquire how far restraint ought to be carried. The limit, we know, lies where the greatest possible freedom of the individual is reconciled with the greatest possible good of the community ; but to trace that limit with accuracy, is certainly a delicate and difficult operation.

Upon the whole, the fact seems to be, that in every society, all changes in matters importantly affecting large bodies of men, are attended more or less with risk and danger ; and that when private persons undertake to effect such changes, they must be content to make the attempt, under a certain degree of peril to themselves. This restraint, upon the dissemination of new doctrines, has existed in all times, and yet the discovery of truth, and the advancement of all useful knowledge, have been progressive ; whereas, if men had been left at full liberty to abuse their reason, whenever prompted by any selfish or sinister motive, it seems more than probable, that truth and knowledge would rather have decayed than flourished. Men would have been condemned to float, without compass or anchor, upon a sea of doubts, buffeted to and fro by the conflicting waves of interminable disputation. The principles of virtue and peace, allowed no time to strike their roots deeply into the heart, would have resembled trees frequently transplanted by the hand of caprice from one spot to another ; which, taking no firm hold on the soil, present a stunted and sickly growth, and are incapable of bearing either blossoms or fruit. But it is time to return from this digression to the question more immediately before us.

The Lecturer goes on to tell us, that “ Sir Everard Home, with the assistance of Mr. Bauer and his microscope, has shewn us a man eight days old from the time of conception—about as broad, and a little longer, than a pin’s head. He satisfied himself that the brain of this homunculus was discernible. Could the immaterial mind have been connected with it at this time ? or was the tenement too small even for so ethereal a lodger ? At the full period of utero-gestation,

it is still difficult to trace any vestiges of mind ; and the believers in its separate existence have left us quite in the dark on the precise time at which the spiritual guest arrives in his corporeal dwelling, the interesting and important moment of amalgamation or combination of the earthly dust and the ethereal essence. The Roman Catholic Church has cut the knot which no one else could untie ; and has decided that the little mortal, on its passage into this world of trouble, has a soul to be saved : it accordingly directs and authorizes midwives, in cases of difficult labour, where the death of the infant is apprehended, to baptize it by means of a syringe introduced into the vagina, and thus to save it from perdition.”—p. 93.

One might be tempted to smile at all this, if a feeling of a severer cast did not interfere, and check the rising sense of the ridiculous. It is impossible to witness, without some indignation, a grave and solemn subject treated in a manner, of which I should be unwilling to say all that I think : or to reflect without sorrow, that such a mode of treating such subjects is too frequently resorted to, especially when the parties addressed are the young and the superficial, with whom the base and worthless counterfeit passes current as sterling argument and sound philosophy.

Sir Everard Home, then, has looked through a microscope, and has seen a fœtus eight days old from the time of conception. (The Lecturer forgets to mention how this period was ascertained). He saw, at least he *satisfied himself* that he saw, even the brain of the embryo. Now, cries the Lecturer, with the air and tone of a man who has just achieved a wonderful discovery, is it possible that this fœtus had a soul at this early period of its existence ? If it had not, pray tell us when does the connexion of the soul and the body take place ? To parade this little fact, was perhaps useful for effect, for a *coup de théâtre*, as the French say ; but surely, in the way of argument, it was not very necessary. I presume it was well known before, that the fœtus has a brain, and that it is extremely diminutive, when first it becomes visible. The same questions might have been asked, and the same answers have been given, if Sir Everard Home, and the master of the microscope, had been inhabitants of the ring of Saturn.

It is an extremely easy thing to ask questions; and if a disputant can only get it admitted, that he shall gain his cause, so soon as he asks one which cannot be answered, let him only ask questions enough and he will be able to prove any thing, and to disprove it afterward, if so inclined. But a question like the one here asked, and no less the reason alleged for asking it, I really was not prepared for, in a grave discussion of an important subject. Pray, says the querist, has a fœtus got a soul?—Why do you inquire?—Because, Sir E. Home has seen the brain of a fœtus eight days old! It is just possible to trace some coherence in this, if we can suppose that a confused notion was floating in the mind of the ingenious person who writes in this manner, that the wonderful microscope was capable of detecting the rudiments of the soul, in their embryo state; that it would shew reason like an atomic seed; memory expanding her web like a tender undulating membrane, and fancy shooting out in delicate and wavering filaments. On no other supposition, am I able to account for his connecting two things so distant from each other. There is some reason for his question, if he imagined that, provided the soul existed, Sir E. Home must have seen it; otherwise, the brain of this eight-day old fœtus, might with equal propriety, have suggested a question about the Alexandrian library, or the wall of China.

Be this however as it may, it is certain that we are utterly ignorant of the time when the union of the soul and body takes place, as well as of the nature of that union. If this were the only mystery in the works of nature, an argument might be founded upon it, with some shew of reason. As the case stands, it is only one, in a universe of mysteries. From the growth of a blade of grass, to the formation of the globe; from the life of a mite, to the awful existence of the Creator; every thing is pregnant with causes of the deepest wonder. If mystery were a ground of doubt, there is hardly a single truth which the gentleman, whose opinions I am combating, ever delivered in a lecture room, which might not be set aside. In the most ordinary occurrences of life, we should be reduced to a state of mere scepticism, and be compelled wholly to abstain from action, did we require that all doubt and difficulty should be removed, before we con-

cluded, or acted. To my apprehension, at least, the impossibility of ascertaining when the union of the soul and body takes place, is no greater mystery than many which occur daily, and which we never deem of sufficient importance to influence our reasonings or our conduct.

The time when the soul is united to the body may be considered, and so far as we know, is actually the commencement of its existence. Mr. Lawrence is of opinion, that our ignorance of that time casts a doubt upon that existence. Why, this argument amounts in fact, to denying existence, because its commencement is unknown. Would any one who reasons in this way, refuse to credit the existence of an eternal Being, because he cannot even imagine a commencement to such an existence? Or, should he fall in with a person, as might readily enough happen, who had forgotten the time of his birth; would he suspect that this person was not truly a man, but only an illusion and a phantom? Barely to state such an argument as this, is, I think, to refute it.

Many productions of nature are elaborated in secret; many changes in those productions are continually going on, although the increments are latent by which the process is effected. We see that a change has taken place; but then only become aware of it, when the process of mutation is complete; in the same way, as we discover that the hour hand of a clock has moved, although the motion itself is not perceptible. We know, for instance, perfectly well, that the small nut which was deposited in the earth many years ago, has now become a large tree. We know that this tree grew continually, and that it still grows, every moment during the proper season; and yet we were never able to see it grow, nor do we know at what moment the germ was first set in motion. In like manner, we are certain that conception takes place; but the moment of its occurrence is unknown, even to the woman who conceives. Once in the course of twenty-four hours, we pass from waking to sleep, and yet the instant which marks this great and surprising change, from one state of existence to another so widely different, was never yet detected, although so frequently occurring. So puberty succeeds to infancy, and there is a moment of time, in which the powers of procreation and conception are perfected; yet no man knows when that moment happens, although it has

happened to all men. Now, because the time and process of these works of nature are unknown, shall we deny that the nut has become a tree, that conception takes place, that sleep alternates with waking, that puberty succeeds to infancy? Whoever is prepared to go the length of these absurdities, may likewise consistently deny the existence of the soul, because the process by which it is formed, and the time when it is united with the body, are unknown. Few, I presume, will venture on those monstrous conclusions;—the absurdity would be too glaring;—but the absurdity of the argument, as applied to the case of the soul and body, is equally great, and only less striking to the general eye, because the subject is more abstruse.

Our Lecturer now remembers the ludicrous story which Sterne tells in his *Tristram Shandy*, of a consultation held by the *Sorbonne*, concerning baptism of the fœtus. When you run low in argument, use ridicule, is advice for disputants; and Mr. Lawrence resolves, in conformity therewith, to eke out the *utile* of his own logic, with the *dulce* of Sterne's wit.

Lectorem delectando, pariterque monendo.

But the ill fortune which attends him in his arguments, seems to pursue him even in the application of a jest. He talks of the Roman Catholic church cutting the knot;—he must permit me to tell him, that a decision of the *Sorbonne*, and a decree of the Romish church, are very different things indeed. The question, moreover, which those doctors of the *Sorbonne* decided, was simply whether baptism could be lawfully administered to an infant, not completely separated from the mother. The time of union between the soul and the body, was no more mooted before them, than the king of England's right to the allegiance of London. Somehow or other, the Lecturer has confounded the two questions; but this one instance of confusion may pass in the crowd.—

The next argument which I meet with, (p. 94.) and it is a favourite with all Materialists, is, that the mind appears to follow the fate of the body, flourishing as it grows, and fading as it decays; in like manner, as the Hamadryades of Paganism, were said to grow and perish with their kindred oaks.

If the soul exist at all, it certainly has had a beginning; for we are not conscious of a past eternity. From the time

when it first began to be, its powers began to unfold themselves; otherwise we should remember the instant of our beginning and be conscious that mental operations were going on and ideas were existing in the mind, at that instant. I am not aware of any reason, which ought to induce us to think, that the existence of a spiritual being is inconsistent with a gradual development of its powers; but I can see many inconveniences which would result from the union of a soul, in the full and independent possession of its utmost faculties, with the feeble and dependent body of an infant. That the powers of the body and those of the mind should observe a certain proportion in their development, and should proceed, as it were, hand in hand together, is certainly a wise provision, and most suitable for our present state. I do not therefore see that any valid argument can be drawn, from the gradual advancement of the intellectual powers, against the immateriality of the soul; and I believe indeed that this branch of the argument, is not much insisted on by Materialists in general.

When we speak of the soul growing with the body, the expression is of course to be understood as metaphorical, and as meaning only, that the soul acquires such knowledge as this world affords, according to its stay herein, and in proportion as the media, by which that knowledge is acquired, namely the bodily organs,—attain perfection. But, if it is absurd to confound those organs, with the principle of thought; it is no less so, to identify that principle with the knowledge which those organs convey. The soul is something else than a collection of impressions, or a bundle of ideas; something on which those impressions are made, and by which those ideas are perceived, marshalled in order, and compared together. Showers and sunshine are not the rose; although their influences impart to the green and infant bud that exquisite assemblage of colour, form, and fragrance, which delight us in the expanded flower. In like manner is knowledge distinct from the soul; although from it, as from its peculiar aliment, the soul derives whatever it possesses of energy, worth, and loveliness. But whether the soul undergoes any intimate change in consequence of such acquirements, is a matter which we do not pretend to determine.

That the mind decays with the body, is an assertion frequently made, and often hastily admitted as true, upon little or no examination. But I am inclined to think, that a close and careful scrutiny will not exhibit to us generally, the minds of aged people in that ruinous and decaying state, which we are apt to imagine. We shall find generally, that futile and silly old people, were futile and silly in their younger days, and that men of eminent genius and attainments most frequently retain to the last, all the essential excellencies which gave splendour to their prime of life. Much of the quickness and energy of youth, which really belongs to the body, we transfer to the intellect; and naturally enough associate the tardiness and decrepitude of age, with the idea of feeble and perishing faculties. The notion that senility is second childhood, is too agreeable, not to be welcomed and ardently enforced by those, who are eagerly waiting to take the business of the world from the hands of their predecessors. The aged, on their part, tranquilly acquiesce in any pretext, which delivers them from a burden, which their bodily infirmities have rendered insupportable. No wonder if, under such circumstances, philosophic truth should suffer from popular prejudice.

If instances of imbecile senility can be produced, instances, on the other hand, of minds "strong in death," under all the pressure of old age, calamity, and sickness, occur to general observation; and with that degree of frequency as to forbid the establishment of a general law in the face of exceptions so numerous. Grant, however, that disease will produce a derangement of the faculties; that in old age the mental powers lose their energy and appear to decay. Do these phenomena depend on the body or on the mind itself? A musician takes a harp, he fits it with strings, he tunes them to accordance with each other. By degrees the instrument attains perfection, and the science and skill of the performer delight and astonish his hearers. At length the strings relax, lose their pitch, some break altogether; the soul of music departs, and nothing is heard but inharmonious and disagreeable sounds: yet the science and skill of the performer are the same as before. Is it impossible that something like this may be the case with the soul of man and its material instrument? We know that the body is

mortal and dissoluble; but all the phenomena of mind appear consistent only with an indivisible and indestructible essence. Here, then, the balance of probabilities is clearly on our side, and furnishes an answer to our question.

If a being, manifested through a given medium, undergo any change in itself; or, if the medium undergo any change which equivalently affects the manifestation, in either case the resulting phenomena will be similar. If the lens of a telescope cause an object to appear inverted, the effect, as regards the observer, is the same as though the object were inverted actually.

Apply this proposition to the case before us. If the mental powers actually decay along with the body, or if the body, by reason of its proper decay, become unfit for displaying the operation of those powers, the effect on the observer will be precisely similar. Now when similar effects are producible by two distinct causes, it is plain, that by reasoning from those effects alone, we shall be unable to discover which of the two causes is the efficient one. Therefore no conclusion against the existence of spirit can be drawn from the apparent decay of the mental powers: because the phenomena would be similar in two supposable distinct cases, a change in the mind itself, and an equivalent change in the body.

It may be said, that powers which we confess to be purely intellectual, appear to decline along with the body: a remarkable and common instance of which is the decay of memory in old age.

This objection is a fair one, and deserves to be considered. There is, however, a peculiarity attached to it, by which its force is greatly mitigated, if not wholly neutralized. It will be observed, that it involves the question,—whether, supposing spirit to exist in intimate union with matter, it is susceptible of being affected thereby, and to what extent? In a subsequent argument I shall endeavour to shew it to be probable, that spirit and matter in union may be subjects of reciprocal affections; but to what extent those affections may reach, we have no means of forming even the slightest conjecture. An objection, therefore, which is drawn from an ignorance common to both parties, and which, if a certain point were ascertained, might turn out to be no objection at

all, is plainly of inferior importance, and very different to an objection grounded on something known, or deduced from some alleged contradiction, or consequential absurdity in the adverse argument.

We are unable then fully to explain why memory appears to decay, simply because that explanation involves questions about which we have no means of forming any propositions. But we are able to shew, and have already shewn, that very absurd consequences will flow from supposing memory a function of matter; and as these arguments appear, at least to my apprehension, greatly to overbalance the difficulty objected, we must, if we would reason soundly, adopt the conclusion to which the weightiest evidence belongs.

That the memory, in old age, exhibits symptoms of decay, must however be taken with some limitation. As regards more recent events, the memory of old people is certainly treacherous; but on the other hand, it tenaciously retains circumstances which occurred long ago, not only during manhood, but even in the early morning of life. The vivacity of these latter recollections does not at all indicate a faculty approaching a state of dissolution; whilst the evanescency of the first mentioned class may be satisfactorily accounted for, without recurring to any such hypothesis. Memory depends on attention. Thousands of objects are perceived every day, of which the memory retains not the slightest vestige. A person walking the crowded streets of a large city, sees hundreds of passengers, not one of whom he would be able to recognise, were they to pass him again an hour afterward; but let ever so trifling a circumstance fix his attention, but for a few seconds, on one of those strangers, and he shall be able to identify that individual after the lapse of perhaps many years. If a man whose memory is usually good, peruses a book or transacts any business, whilst his mind is oppressed by any great anxiety, or whilst suffering any bodily pain, by which his attention is distracted, he will have but a confused and imperfect recollection of what he has read or done. These, and all such instances of imperfect memory, we do not hesitate to refer to inattention, which is their true cause. In the early part of life many causes operate to produce a lively attention; towards its close, those causes lose their energy,

whilst others of an opposite tendency become active. I apprehend that from these circumstances originates chiefly that remarkable difference which we observe between the retentive faculties of the young and the old.

In youth, the charm of novelty which surrounds all objects, and many other strong inducements and motives, lead us to examine every pleasurable object with a spontaneous attention. Analogous feelings draw the mind even to objects which are painful, and hence the memory receives deep and indelible impressions. In old age, on the contrary, the interest in all external objects is on the wane. Novelty has then ceased to charm, passion and appetite are lulled to rest, and range no longer for objects of gratification. Infirmities crowd in apace, languor exanimates, and pain distracts attention. Events, which once would have excited keen emotions, pass almost unnoticed, and the vibration of feelings so faintly struck, hardly reaches the retentive power. It is thus that the old man vividly remembers the friends and companions of the bright days of his youth, whilst he forgets the persons with whom he conversed but yesterday. All these causes of inattention and forgetfulness are plainly connected with the state of the body, or the circumstances of external things. They would exist and be operative, even were the separate existence of the soul a truth mathematically demonstrable. They sufficiently account for those particular lapses of memory which are observable in the decline of life, and which afford the only appearance of reason for suspecting that the faculty itself is liable to dissolution.

Nor do any of the mental powers exhibit at the approach of death any symptoms of dissolution at all equivalent to those which are visible in the body. In the great majority of cases, the mind appears, to the very last gasp, full of activity and vigour, retaining the same quickness of perception, the same accuracy in reasoning, and the same moral sense which it ever possessed. But even if the disturbance of the mental powers were far greater at the approach of death than is actually the case in any instance, no presumption could be thence raised that death is the destruction of those powers. For as death is to our certain knowledge the destruction of the body, and as we no less certainly discern the mental powers, only through the medium

of the body ; it is evident that as it approaches dissolution, those powers must become less and less discernible ; and the mode of their disappearance, whether rapid and simultaneous, or slow and successive, will as clearly depend on the circumstances under which the dissolution of the body takes place. That the mental powers may sustain a violent shock, and may undergo a great change at death, is highly probable ; but there exists not the slightest reason for concluding that such change extends to annihilation. We know not what death is in itself, and therefore it must appear clearly absurd to assign effects to such a cause, the energy of which is unknown. Death happens but once, consequently we have no means of reasoning from experience. There is nothing in nature like death, and thus we can derive no assistance from analogy. Before experience had taught us that the powers of the mind can exist, although their exercise is suspended ; there was as much reason to presume, that those powers would remain for ever in that unconscious state in which they exist during sleep, or a swoon, as there now is for presuming that they are annihilated by death. The reflection which Milton makes Adam express, on his first experiencing the sensations of approaching sleep, is not less philosophically just than poetically beautiful :

“ On a green shady bank profuse of flowers
 Pensive I sat me down ; there gentle sleep
 First found me, and with soft oppression seiz’d
 My drowsed sense, untroubled, though I thought
 I then was passing to my former state
 Insensible, and forthwith to dissolve.”—*Paradise Lost*, book 8.

The presumption that death is the extinction of being, stands on no better grounds than that which Adam is represented as entertaining with respect to sleep. It is only a vague apprehension, compounded partly of fear, partly of ignorance, and partly of a presentiment that we are about to undergo a momentous change ; a presentiment, which even in such affairs of life as portend any thing new and strange, is never unmixed with a certain degree of anxiety and alarm. But no shadow of reason whatever can be shewn in behalf of such presumption, either from the nature of death itself, or from experience, or analogy.

“ The number and kind of the intellectual phenomena in different animals, correspond closely to the degree of development of the brain.”—[*Lect.* p. 94.]

To develope means to unfold, so that according as the brain is more or less unfolded, the powers of intellect are more or less perfect. In your men of eminent genius, the brain is spread out like a peacock's tail, “ spangled with eyes,” and glistening with a rainbow of colours. On the other hand, in persons of dull parts and costive intellect, the brain is packed up in the smallest possible compass, and crammed into a skull, where it has no room to grow, just as the foot of a Chinese woman is squeezed into a tiny slipper, in which it is destined to be cramped and crippled for life. In a subsequent passage the Lecturer says, “ It is strongly suspected that a Newton or a Shakspeare excels other mortals only by a more ample development of the anterior cerebral lobes, by having an *extra inch* of brain in the right place.” According to this *strong suspicion*, thought is dependent on magnitude, figure, and position. Now, these three properties of substance fall in the peculiar province of geometry. So, from this, it follows, that by inspecting a man's brain, and by taking the guage of his skull, it will be possible to demonstrate geometrically the quality and extent of his intellectual powers. How little did Euclid dream for what he was laying a foundation, when he wrote about his circles, and squares, and triangles, and parallelograms ! Oh ! that he could be called from his resting place to behold a Materialist philosopher, taking the angles of imagination, bisecting memory, finding the locus of reason, and demonstrating to a hair's breadth the situation, the “ right place,” of that “ extra inch ;” but for which Shakspeare would have remained a deer-stealer all his days, and the illustrious author of the *Principia* have been, perhaps, a physiological Materialist.

“ The mind of the Negro and the Hottentot, the Calmuck and the Carib, is inferior to that of the European, and their organization is also less perfect.”—p. 94.

In this passage it is gratuitously assumed that the European organization is the standard of perfection ; and then it is decided, of course, that the forms which differ from it are less perfect. But, in the absence of evidence on this point,

there appears as good reason for assuming the Negro form as a standard, and for condemning the European. The curves, it will be said, are in that less flowing, the contour less grand and commanding. Habit of thinking—I reply,—egotism, association, matter of taste ; as if one man should prefer the Roman, another the Grecian, nose ; one the slender elegance of the Apollo, another the massive strength of the Farnesian Hercules. We are so much accustomed to the great superiority of the enlightened European over the unblest and benighted African, that some of us would extend that superiority even to the form of his bones. The mental process by which these theorists arrive at their conclusion, seems to be this :—From the general superiority of the European, they persuade themselves that his skull is better shaped, more fitted for thinking, as they say, than the skulls of other races of men ; and then, reasoning in a circle, from that better shape they deduce his superiority.

I would ask, does the European possess faculties not enjoyed by the other races of men ? The answer must be—no : he only excels them in the degree of the same faculties. Now, the faculties of the mind are expanded and sharpened by use, by situation, education, habit, government, religion, and by a great variety of other circumstances. In all these respects the Europeans of the present age are superior to the Europeans who lived three thousand years ago. Will it be said that the organization of the moderns is more perfect ? If it *is*, shew the fact to be so. If it is *not*, then organization is not *the* cause, nor *a* cause of their superiority. But the difference between the ancient and modern Europeans is as great as the difference between these last and the Negro, or Calmuck race ! Therefore, if organization be not a cause of the difference between the ancient and modern inhabitants of Europe, it is not reasonable to assign it as the cause of the not greater difference between the Europeans of the present day, and the other races above-mentioned.

It may be asked upon this—Why then have those barbarous nations remained stationary in civilization, or nearly so, whilst the Europeans have advanced ? The question is curious, but not pertinent. It is, as though one should ask, in a geographical discussion, why Rome became the capital of the world, rather than Memphis or Babylon ? We are not

bound here to investigate the causes which have produced superior civilization amongst the European race. It is enough for our argument to shew that organization is not one of those causes.

Let us however imagine an experiment. Suppose a colony of Negroes or Hottentots planted in some district of France or England; restricted from intermarriage with the natives, but allowed a free intercourse with them in all other respects. Which of these two results is more likely: That they would, or would not, in process of time, become equal to the inhabitants of the surrounding country? If organization be the cause of their present inferiority, nothing short of changing that organization would avail any thing. No length of time, no propitious circumstances would produce any improvement. You might as well bring in a colony of Kangaroos. If, on the contrary, they would improve in the arts of life, and the powers of intellect, it must be confessed that organization is not the cause of their actual barbarism. He who can bring himself to assert that, in the case supposed, they never would improve; must, I think, have great confidence in his own theory; or, perhaps, he may not have possessed very ample opportunities for observing the Negro, the Calmuck, and the Carib; or, finally, perhaps he may have paid more attention to the structure of the body, than to the constitution of the mind.*

“ If the intellectual phenomena of man require an immaterial principle superadded to the brain, we must equally concede it to those more rational animals which exhibit manifestations differing from some of the human only in degree. If we grant it to these, we cannot refuse it to the next in order, and so on in succession to the whole series.— Is any one prepared to admit the existence of an immaterial principle in all these cases? If not, he must equally reject it in man.”—*Lect.* p. 96.

The fallacy of this argument lies in assuming that the

* Shortly after the above passage was written, I met with the following article in one of the daily vehicles of public intelligence. “ There are fifty-three Chocktaw students, and twenty white students, at the Chocktaw Academy in Kentucky, all of whom, at a recent examination, gave evidence of great improvement. The Creek Indians have requested permission to send fifteen or twenty of their children to the same school.”—*Times Newspaper*, January 16, 1827.

actions of animals proceed from a principle similar to that which produces thought in man, and that the difference between them and man, is one of degree only. This supposition is destitute of all proof, and must remain so, until such time as brutes shall be able to tell us whether they think or no. The actions of brutes, even those actions which appear the most intelligent, afford no more evidence of thought than do the motions of a steam-engine. In the engine, as well as in the brute, we discern a nice and regular adaptation of means to ends; a system of acts performed according to certain laws, and from this we infer the agency of an intellectual cause. But there is not one tittle more of reason for concluding that such a cause is present in the brute, after the manner in which it exists in man, than there is for supposing that intelligence is present in the steam-engine. Consciousness is the only evidence of Thought; and we do not know, and probably never shall know, whether brutes are conscious of their own existence, in any way at all analogous to the consciousness of the human mind. An argument, therefore, which assumes this fact as a postulate, is no better than a baseless and untenable sophism.

If authority were to decide whether the principle of thought is the same in brutes as in man; perhaps one might still venture to array the opinion of Buffon against any of our more modern naturalists, notwithstanding all the lights which, it is said, have lately broken in upon the world. "If," says that eloquent writer, "the internal sensations," (thereby meaning thought), "be properties of matter, and are dependent on the bodily organs; should we not witness amongst animals of the same species, as amongst men, a remarkable difference in their productions. Would not such as are better organized than others, form their cells; their nests, and their shells, in a more solid, elegant, and convenient manner? And if one had more genius than another, would he not certainly manifest it in this way? But nothing of all this happens, or has ever happened. Must we not conclude, therefore, that the greater or less perfection of the bodily organs has no influence upon the nature of the internal sensations; that no sensations of this kind are possessed by animals; that they cannot be properties of matter, nor depend as to their nature on bodily

“organs? Must there not consequently exist in man a substance different from matter, which is the subject and the cause by which those sensations are produced and received?”*

This argument, drawn from the phenomena of the brute creation, is often urged by Materialists. We may reply to it generally :—That if we find sufficient reason from observing the properties of matter, on the one hand, and the operations of the human mind on the other, to conclude that mind and matter are distinct in essence; we are not to be deterred from that conclusion by difficulties which may be started concerning other orders of the creation. If I am required to understand all truth, before I am allowed to believe any truth, I must remain for ever in a state of perfect pyrrhonism. Will Mr. Lawrence be willing to admit that all which is contained in his book is mere unauthorized conjecture, because there are points in physiology as yet uncertain? Or will he take one measure for himself, and mete differently to others?

But, for my own part, I see no great difficulty or incongruity in supposing that an immaterial principle may possibly exist in every class of living beings, increasing in power and dignity as it ascends

——— To man's imperial race,
From the green myriads in the peopled grass

That intellectual natures admit of gradation is certain, otherwise all must be finite, or all infinite. That all are not infinite is clear, for we ourselves are not so; and that all, without ONE exception, should be finite, would be the greatest of all impossibilities. It does not seem a very unreasonable conjecture, that between man and the infinite intelligence, there may exist many intermediate orders of spiritual beings. And if this be the case, why not also from man downwards? The immaterial world, proceeding from the same inexhaustible source as the visible creation, may, like it, be diversified into endless forms of excellence and beauty, may be adorned with gradations of being, ascending from the first faint glimmering of intellect, to an effulgence

* “*Sil les sensations interieures appartenoint à la matière,*” &c.—Buffon, *Hist. Naturelle de l'Homme*.

of mental splendour and majesty, beyond the utmost reach of conception.

——— As from the root
 Springs lighter the green stalk, from thence the leaves
 More æëry, last the bright consummate flower
 Spirit odórous breathes.—*Milton.*

But whether spirit admits of varieties, or whether, supposing an immaterial principle in lower animals, it may not be entirely different from that which exists in man, are questions wholly beyond our reach. At all events, our present business is to reason, not to conjecture.

“The functions end where the respective organ ceases”—
 “No feelings, no thought, no intellectual operation has ever
 “yet been seen except in conjunction with a brain.” (*Lect.*
p. 96.)

The power or capacity, for aught that has been shewn to the contrary, does not end where the organ ceases,—I mean, ceases to act;—the means of exerting it merely are wanting. If I have no pen, I cannot write;—but the power of writing still remains to me. In the next place, mind does not exist in this world, apart from matter; and he who expects to see intellectual operations, (at least so far as man is concerned,) except in conjunction with a body, seems no less unreasonable than one, who should expect music, without an instrument.—

“To say that a thing of merely negative properties, that
 “is an immaterial substance, which is neither evidenced by
 “any direct testimony nor by any indirect proof from its
 “effects does exist and can think, is quite consistent in
 “those who deny thought to animal structures, where we
 “see it going on every day.” (*Lect. p. 97.*)

It is sometimes necessary to discuss the husk and shell of an author’s phraseology, in order to get at his meaning; yet generally, I place but little value on arguments derived from loose and inaccurate expressions in an author. However, when such expressions occur frequently; more especially in a philosophical disquisition, and are so egregious, as those contained in the above-cited paragraph; they evince a similar confusion in the ideas of the writer, and indispose us to pay much regard to his authority. A sagacious and excellent critic has justly observed,

" Selon que notre idée est plus ou moins obscure,
 " L'expression la suit ou moins nette, ou plus pure.
 " Ce que l'on conçoit bien, s'énonce clairement,
 " Et les mots pour le dire, arrivent aisément.—*Boileau.*

Mr. Lawrence here speaks of "*negative properties.*" From what nomenclature, indigenous or exotic, this phrase is borrowed, I cannot say; but this I know, that a *negation of properties* has a clear and definite meaning, but that "*negative properties,*" is equivalent to "*non-existent entity*" and is (the Lecturer will pardon the harshness of the expression, for the sake of its propriety) is absolute nonsense.

"*Immaterial substance.*" If Mr. Lawrence uses the word substance in this place, in the popular sense, and means by it something which has extension and solidity; such substance is material; and "*immaterial substance*" the same as if he had said, "*immaterial matter.*" If by substance he means a *substratum*, he will favour us by explaining what his notion is of a *substratum* devoid of properties; for "*immaterial substance,*" and "*a thing of negative properties,*" are with him æquipollent terms. Of course no advocate of spirit could ever think of describing the principle of thought as a thing devoid of properties. The rightful ownership of the language is in Mr. Lawrence, and no one, I think, will be found likely to deprive him of it.

He next asserts roundly that we are unable to adduce any testimony, direct or indirect, of the existence of spirit. This is a bold specimen of that species of argument, which is termed by logicians "*ad ignorantiam*;" although it must be confessed, that this kind of argument is ambiguous; inasmuch as it will have nearly the same appearance, on whichever side the ignorance lies; whether with the party using the argument, or with the party addressed. How the matter is to be viewed in this particular instance, is not very important to determine. It is certainly a very common practice with our modern *philosophers*, to restate an old question in a disguised manner, as though it were something new, and to be argued for the first time. They pass over all that has been said on the opposite side, and urge worn-out arguments, which have been refuted over and over again, without taking the least notice of the refutation. This disingenuous conduct passes current with the multitude. Many of our youth, attracted by some popular teacher, perhaps eminent

in his way, adopt implicitly the opinions which he mixes up with his real business, although perhaps slenderly qualified to handle them. These he vends as of the newest fashion, and they as such receive them; little suspecting, that they are the mere ghosts of absurdities on which literary justice has been done long ago, and which have been sleeping ever since in dust and darkness, amongst the pages of Hobbes or Spinoza, of Bolingbroke or Hume.

“We see thought going on in animal structures, every day.” The man who can see thought must be a suitable companion for Fine-ear; who, as the tale informs us, could hear the grass grow. It is not surprising that one whose senses are so peculiar should reason in a manner quite his own. As for us, we know indeed that thought is united with our animal structure; but we do not pretend to see that thought is an effect of that structure; on the contrary, we have strong reasons for believing, that it neither is nor can be so in ourselves. With respect to inferior animals, whether they think at all, in the way that man thinks, is wholly uncertain: the probability seems to be, that they do not. This being our doctrine, we are able very consistently to deny thought to animal structure, and consequently to affirm that it is the act of an immaterial being.

We are next informed, that it is erroneous to suppose insanity a disease of the mind, it being truly a disease of the brain. When stupor, he continues, results from bone depressed on the brain, we do not say the mind is squeezed, but ascribe the injury to the brain only. So in phrenzy, delirium, intoxication, we explain the phenomena by the state of the cerebral circulation, and never say that the mind is delirious, mad, or drunk. “What should we think (*Lect.* p. 98.) “of a person who told us that the organs have nothing to do “with the business, that cholera, jaundice, hepatitis, are “diseases of an immaterial hepatic being, that asthma, cough, “consumption, are affections of a subtle pulmonary matter; “or that in both cases the disorder is not in bodily organs, “but in a vital principle? If such a statement would be “deemed too absurd for any serious comment in the de- “rangements of the lungs, liver, and other organic parts, how “can it be received in the brain?”

“Then we find the brain like other parts subject to func-

“ tional disorder; but although we cannot demonstrate the
 “ fact, we no more doubt that the material cause of the symp-
 “ toms, or external signs of disease, is in this organ, than
 “ we do that impaired biliary secretion has its source in the
 “ liver, or faulty digestion in the stomach. The brain does
 “ not often come under the inspection of the anatomist in
 “ such cases of functional disorder, but I am convinced from
 “ my own experience that the heads of very few persons dying
 “ deranged will be examined after death, without shewing
 “ diseased structure or evident signs of increased vascular
 “ activity.”

The design of this argument is to shew that those perturbations of intellect, which we distinguish as insanity or delirium, according to the different circumstances which attend them, are of the same class with those symptoms of cerebral derangement, with which it is affirmed they are generally conjoined. That the incoherency and raving of a madman, are not *consequences* of diseased brain, but are in fact a *part* of the disease, are merely states of the brain, in a similar way to that, in which suppuration or gangrene are particular states of a wound. Upon which it is concluded, that they who consider insanity an affection of the mind, proceeding from disordered brain, ought by parity of reasoning to regard the disordered functions of the lungs, liver, &c. as derangements of certain immaterial beings, attached respectively to those organs.

The first thing here observable is, that in this argument, the mechanical or chemical *causes* of disease, and the sensible *appearances* consequent upon the operation of those causes, are confounded with the perceptions, or, as I shall here term them, *sensations*, produced by those causes in the percipient power. Each disease has a class of sensations peculiar to itself, or nearly so; but those sensations are not the disease; nor any part of it; unless an *effect* can be properly said to be its own cause, or a part thereof. If insanity is to be reckoned a disease of the brain, in the same sense as we say that inflammation is a disease of that organ; then giddiness may be said to be plethora; inability to move, paralysis; and I may affirm, with equal correctness, that my watch, and the perception I have that it now is twelve o'clock, are one and the same thing. Those who argue after this fashion,

surely take a great deal of pains to confuse and darken a very simple and clear matter. And what do they propose in the room of that system they object to? Another scheme, which involves difficulties precisely similar to those which they cannot digest in the old one, and which is chargeable besides with numerous and monstrous absurdities, from which that is free. For instance, the Materialist does not say that the pain experienced from a wounded muscle, or a fit of the gout, is either divided fibre, or inflammatory action. Even, according to his scheme, the pain is something distinct from all the symptoms apparent to sense; he holds that it does not exist in the affected part; for example, the foot or the hand; nor begin to be, until a certain stimulus has been conveyed to the brain from those distant extremities. He admits that the brain is affected by the hand or foot; that is, he admits that *consequences* of disease are present in an organ where that disease is not. At the same time, he cannot explain the mechanism by which this takes place. Now, is there not to the full as great difficulty in conceiving how this can happen, as there is in conceiving that diseases of the brain exert a perturbing influence upon the intellectual power, and that thus the *consequences* of those diseases are present, where the diseases themselves are not, although we likewise are unable to comprehend the manner in which the effect is produced?

In treating this argument, Mr. Lawrence places perception in the same category with the acknowledged material symptoms of disease; and then reasons as if this classification were admitted—which is plainly begging the question. At the same time, he as clearly falls into an *ignoratio elenchi*, as it is termed; for the question here is concerning the *nature* of the percipient power, and not whether diseased brain accompanies deranged intellect; which conjunction of phenomena it is the drift of his argument to establish; but which might equally be the case whether the percipient power were material or otherwise. It is no less evident, that the absurd inferences which he seeks to fasten on us, are truly applicable to his own system. They who believe that an immaterial principle exists, which is affected by every thing that passes in the body, have no need to imagine “hepatic beings,” or any other distinct subjects of particular

diseases ; but what reason can the Materialist allege against supposing that the stomach does not perceive *dyspepsia*, the lungs *phthisis*, the eyes *amaurosis*, or any other organ its appropriate derangement; when he tells us that the brain perceives the diseases which are peculiar to itself? These absurdities are nearly akin to his system, but are infinitely distant from ours.

There is not any thing then in these arguments to prevent us from concluding, that as different kinds of *sensations*, originating in different diseases, are truly *consequences* thereof, and affections of the percipient power; so the perturbed affections which we term insanity when chronic, and delirium when produced by fever, intoxication, or other temporary causes, are truly affections of the mind, and the *peculiar consequences* of diseases incidental to the brain. From those *consequences* the mind is relieved, when the cerebral disorder is removed, just as it is relieved from the analagous affections of another class, when a wound is healed, or a fit of the gout abated. Perturbed intellect (supposing it *always* attended by cerebral derangement, a fact which, although not fully established, seems nevertheless highly probable) is thus to be considered as an *effect* of diseased brain, not the disease itself. Let therefore the appearance in the heads of persons dying deranged be what they may, they will prove only that those persons had diseased brain; but nothing whatever can be concluded from them concerning the *nature* of that principle, by which the effects of the disease were perceived.

Before I take leave of this argument I shall endeavour to shew, 1. That it may be retorted on the Materialist. 2. That it proceeds upon an assumption which involves absurd conclusions. 3. That the facts alleged make rather against than for it.

1. It may be retorted. The entire argument, if I rightly understand its tendency, may be thus compressed.

In all, or nearly all cases, where the intellectual operations are performed in a disorderly manner, symptoms of disease are observable in the brain; and from this nearly uniform conjunction of phenomena, it is to be inferred, that those operations proceed from the brain, and are nothing more than functions of that organ.

I have already shewn in general, that the arguments used by Materialists against the existence of spirit, may be successfully retorted upon them, to disprove the existence of matter. From what has been there shewn, the above proposition may be thus reversed.

In all, or nearly all cases, where the intellectual operations are performed in a disorderly manner, symptoms of disease are observable in the brain, and from this nearly uniform conjunction of phenomena, it is to be inferred, that those symptoms are nothing more than *manifestations of disordered intellect*.

For if matter be proved not to exist, it is evident that it cannot be a subject of disease, nor a cause of phenomena. But its existence may be disproved, if the mode of argument used by Materialists be admitted as valid.

2. The argument proceeds upon an assumption involving absurd consequences. It affirms that the contemporaneous existence of two classes of phenomena, viz. insanity and diseased brain, proves that both are affections of one essence or substratum.

No reason is given for confining this proposition to the particular case. We are therefore at liberty to regard it as affirmed generally. But it is so far from being generally true, that it is almost, if not altogether, universally false. It is false, for example, in all cases of cause and effect, where the operation of the cause is continuous. Thus the phenomena of vision and of light co-exist, and are very nearly related, but we do not infer that vision resides in light, and deny the existence of the eye. The moon and the ocean exhibit conjunct phenomena, but we do not say that the tides are phenomena of the moon, and that the ocean has no existence. To these, however, and similar absurdities should we be led, by adopting the above proposition. Now, this proposition is the key-stone of the whole argument.

3. The facts alleged make rather against than for the argument. That all the parts or principles, be they what they may, of which man is composed, are so united as to constitute a perfect oneness in the individual, will not, I suppose, be disputed. If man were what Materialists assert, a simple homogeneous nature, it is clear that oneness, or perfect individuality, would be the necessary result of his homogeneity.

The Materialist, therefore, will cheerfully admit that man actually displays this character. This oneness being considered, it plainly appears, that if the soul of man exist at all, it must be united to the body in a very close and intimate manner. Such a close and intimate union existing between two principles, will render it probable in the very highest degree, that numerous relations subsist between them, and that they reciprocally affect and influence each other, in a variety of instances. If the existence of two principles thus combined were shewn to be probable by proofs apart from all considerations of that reciprocal influence, and if it should afterward be discovered that such an influence did actually subsist; it must be acknowledged, that those proofs would derive from that fact a very powerful confirmation. Now, this is actually the case with those two principles, which we term matter and spirit. The existence of matter is evidenced by our senses, by the absurdities consequent upon denying it. The existence of spirit, we have proved by a testimony equivalent to that of the senses; the testimony of consciousness; by shewing that many and outrageous absurdities are involved in supposing the properties of mind inherent in matter, and by other considerations, which carry the proof to the highest degree of moral certainty. After this, we find by observation, that such phenomena do really occur, as we might reasonably infer from the existence of spirit and matter, closely united in one individual. We discover that the habits and complexions of our thoughts and passions affect the body; and that the constitution and state of the body affect, in their turn, the thoughts and passions. We discover, that joy and grief, shame, rage, terror, quicken or retard the circulation of the blood; relax muscular action to helplessness, or excite it to involuntary and convulsive energies. Even those loftier and more tranquil emotions, that spring from the consciousness of great resolves, or virtuous purposes, bid the heart glow with unusual warmth, and the nerves thrill with finer sensations. That mental dejection, so well described as sickness of heart, will in a short time open a grave for the healthy, whilst a calm and buoyant mind is more to the sick, than a whole dispensatory of medicines. On the other hand, the body no less actively influences the mind. When it enjoys sound health, the mind

is disposed to serenity and cheerfulness, whilst the rackings of pain, or the more secret operations of latent disease, impede the working of the intellectual powers, and sometimes even shake reason from her seat. These are the phenomena which our reasonings concerning the existence of the soul and its union with the body, lead us naturally to expect. It is for every candid unbiassed person to say, whether those reasonings do not receive from them a confirmation, as strong and remarkable as it is possible for theory to derive from experience. To my apprehension, they give to the system of the Materialist the finishing stroke. His cause is ruined by his own witnesses. His facts and arguments, like soldiers pressed into a foreign service, desert when brought into action, and pass over to the standards of their friends and countrymen.

Thus have I chiefly drawn from the very arguments of Mr. Lawrence, materials for shewing their insufficiency. There is yet another point which I shall submit, from the same source. He says, "all the manifestations called mental or intellectual, are the animal functions of their appropriate organic apparatus; &c." That is, every act of intelligence performed by man, originates in mere matter appropriately organized, or put together. And elsewhere, when he pressed us with an argument drawn from the constitution of inferior animals, he has told us by implication, that the apparently intelligent actions of brutes have a like origin. Thus he affirms, that every intellectual act performed by every being in the visible universe, results from matter.

In this statement two consequences are implied; viz., That every act of intelligence of a like nature to human intelligence, may proceed from matter; and also, that matter is capable of producing various degrees of intelligence.

If a traveller were to land upon the coast of a foreign country, and were to see there cultivated fields, instruments of tillage, roads and dwellings, would he not conclude, even before seeing any of the inhabitants, that the country was peopled by men of an intellectual nature, similar to his own? That is to say, he would infer from the nature of the facts witnessed, the quality of the acts and the nature of the agents. In the place of such a traveller, suppose a Materialist philosopher conveyed to some other planet of our

system, and that he should there witness phenomena of a like character to those displayed on our globe. Upon his principles he would of course ascribe those phenomena to organized matter; since, if those principles hold in one case, they must also hold in all cases of the same nature. He would therefore draw the same conclusion in every point of the universe throughout infinite space. And thus he is compelled to admit, that *every* act of intelligence congenerous to the intelligence of man, proceeds from matter. Now we have no idea of any kind of intelligence but what is congenerous to our own, and compounded of the same two elements of power and knowledge. There is not a single operation performed throughout the visible universe, but what we are able to imagine might be accomplished by power and knowledge, differing from the power and knowledge of man, not in *kind*, but in *degree* only.* He, therefore, who holds that the operations of the human mind proceed from matter, must go the length of referring to the same cause every act of intelligence displayed throughout the universe.

Nor can the *degree* of intelligence displayed afford any means of eluding this consequence. The Materialist believes, that through all the gradations of being, from the polypus and oyster up to man, every intellectual operation proceeds from matter. How numerous are these gradations, how distant their extremes! But, add to them one rank more, a little above man. Can any reason be assigned why the same principles should not apply to such a being, which are applicable equally to the elephant, to the negro, to Newton? Then, double the distance, and conceive a being as much above man (although still of the same kind of intellectual nature) as man is above the polypus or oyster. Would not the same principles apply in this case also? And if so, as most certainly they would, where shall we stop? There is no limit, we must go on to infinity. If we admit that matter is capable of producing any *one* act of intelligence, there is no avoiding the consequence that it may and does produce acts of infinite intelligence. We are driven to conclude, that the

* I except *creative* power, and for two reasons. Because it is a power *per se*, which we do not witness in *act*; and because the chain of reasoning by which the creation of matter is demonstrated, involves the proof of the existence of spirit.

self-existent Being, the “ High and Holy One, who inhabiteth eternity,” is but mere matter, the *brain of the world*, as some philosophers have expressed themselves. The Materialist can deal with this consequence in but one of three ways. He must say, either that the Deity is material, or that He is not material; or, lastly, that he himself is yet in doubt and uncertainty on that head. I can hardly suppose that any man, fit to be seriously reasoned with, can bring himself to believe in the existence of an *infinite material being*; a being, which although one and the same, is insentient in a stone, and intellectual in man; inert in all its parts, yet, in the whole, the cause of universal motion; which must be taken either to occupy the same point, in the same instant, as other matter, or else to act where it is not, with a host of other absurdities, fit only for a lunatic to utter. If, in the second place, he should say, that the Deity is immaterial, he must thereby abandon his own principles; for he will admit that spirit (*i. e.* something not matter) does exist, and does perform acts of intelligence congenerous with those performed by man;—and admitting this, he will consider whether he does not give up the entire question at issue. Lastly, should he say, that on this point he is yet fluctuating in doubt and uncertainty; what would this be but to confess, that he has no certainty, notwithstanding all his arguments, that spirit does not exist. I would then remind him, that others, by taking a different course, have attained to settled opinions on this subject; that they have gained the haven, whilst he is tossing about, the sport of winds and waves, without star or compass, without any thing certain in heaven or earth to guide him. At all events, I would take leave to hint, that if he be still doubting and uncertain, it becomes one so circumstanced, rather still to inquire and learn, than to decide with a confidence which ought to proceed only from a clear view and full assurance of truth:

There is one phenomenon of the human mind so singular and striking, that any one who turns his attention to the subject of these observations can hardly fail to notice it; and on every one who does consider it carefully, it must, I think, produce a deep impression. The phenomenon to which I allude, is the capacity of the human mind to acquire a knowledge of the existence of God; to discern the attri-

butes of the Divine Nature, and to conform thereto its own character, so far as the difference between finite and infinite will permit. Unlike all other creatures which walk the earth, or swim the ocean, man extends his views above this world and beyond the present scene. In the God-like capacity of his mind, he embraces the past, the present, and the future. His imagination stretches her mighty wing through infinite space, whilst reason explores the very bosom of her Creator, and from the height of her throne, looks down upon suns and worlds; as the eye regards the glow-worm's lamp, or particles of dust.

Say, why was man so eminently rais'd
Amid the vast creation, why ordain'd
Through life and death to dart his piercing eye,
With thoughts beyond the limit of his frame;
But that the Omnipotent might send him forth
In sight of mortal and immortal power,
As on a boundless theatre, to run
The great career of justice; to exalt
His generous aim to all diviner deeds;
To chase each partial purpose from his breast;
And through the tossing tide of chance and pain,
To hold his course unfaltering, while the voice
Of truth and virtue up the steep ascent
Of Nature, calls him to his high reward,
The applauding smile of Heaven?—*Akenside.*

This character is peculiar to man, and distinguishes him far more essentially from every other inhabitant of the globe, than all the differences of structure and vital economy, which the labours of the anatomist and physiologist unfold. Can any man think that he has fully explained this phenomenon, when he has analysed our ideas of the Divine Nature and has shewn by what means, whether of sensation, reflection, or any other, they are made to grow up in the mind? That the mind should attain to such ideas, is an end proposed in the original constitution of its nature; and merely to describe the means by which that end is produced, certainly does not touch the question why such an end is at all proposed, and what is indicated by its existence? When it is considered how universal this phenomenon is, how deeply it penetrates the human breast, and what a powerful influence it exerts upon the character of man; it will not seem too bold to challenge the whole circle of science, to produce a single fact, which better warrants any inference deduced

from it, than this great fact warrants the strong conclusion; that the spirit of man is of a nature far removed from "the beasts that perish," and maintains a relation to the "Father of Spirits," altogether different from that of any inferior creature.

Let the Materialist, who considers the mental powers of men and beasts as alike in nature, differing only in degree, and deriving that nature and that difference from organic conformation; let him, I say, reconcile with his system the above phenomenon of the human mind. .

The course of the argument having thus led me to the confines of theology, seems to invite me to pass over them and examine the reasons alleged by Mr. Lawrence, in a subsequent part of these lectures, against the inspiration of the writings of Moses. If any should conceive that the few remarks which I shall offer on this topic are here out of place, my excuse is, that they are far less foreign to the subject of the preceding disquisition, than the arguments on which they comment, are to a lecture on physiology. The question whether man have an immaterial part,—a soul,—surely transcends in importance and interest the ordinary speculations of philosophy, and far more nearly concerns every one of us, than any discussions, however valuable, on the phenomena of life, the motions of the heavenly bodies, or the properties of gases and minerals. A belief in the existence of the soul naturally leads us to inquire eagerly into any system, which professes to open to our view its prospects in a future state of its being. That such a system is contained in the sacred writings, and depends on their authority, I need not say. It is equally well known, that the existence and immateriality of the soul are expressly declared in various passages of those writings, and from many more may be clearly inferred. That the Materialist should therefore renounce the Scriptures; or that a disbeliever in the Scriptures should become a Materialist, is not very surprising. On the other hand, it will be admitted, that to establish on any point the authority of the Scriptures, is adding one argument more to those which have been already proposed. To their authority I have not indeed appealed, nor do I now intend directly to appeal to it, for the purpose

of cutting a knot, which reason seems competent to untie ; but thus much seemed necessary, in order to remind the reader, that from a discourse on spirit and matter, to a biblical criticism, the transition is not so violent, nor the connexion between them so remote, as at first view might appear. The harmonist, in the most trivial air, must observe a certain regularity in the career of his modulations ; and even in the pages of an ephemeral pamphlet, the poetical rule should not be entirely forgotten :

Singula quæque loca teneant, sortita decenter.—HORAT.

The first argument to which I shall apply myself, is found at page 215, of the Lectures, and is thus stated : “To the
“ grounds of doubt respecting inspiration, which arise from
“ examination of the various narratives, from knowledge of
“ the original and other oriental languages, and from the ir-
“ reconcilable opposition between the passions and senti-
“ ments ascribed to the Deity by Moses, and that religion of
“ peace and love unfolded by the Evangelists, I have only to
“ add, that the representation of all the animals being
“ brought before Adam, and subsequently of their being all
“ collected in the ark, if we are to understand them as ap-
“ plied to the living inhabitants of the whole world, are
“ zoologically impossible.”

I shall not address myself to those “grounds of doubt,” which “arise from the *various* narratives,” although I know but of *one* narrative, the one in question, which possesses even the shadow of a claim to inspiration ; nor shall I stop to shew how inapplicable are the tests of philology, to determine the divine origin of Scripture ; neither shall I attempt to evince that the views afforded by the Scriptures of the Infinite Mind, are so far from being irreconcilably opposed to each other, that they are perfectly consistent, and altogether worthy of that great and awful Being. All this has been done often and far better than I could hope to do it. My business shall merely be with the additional offering, the little *ex voto* tablet, which the Lecturer hangs up, in his own name, in the temple of the “Goddess of Reason,” as a grateful acknowledgment of deliverance from the thralldom of vulgar credulity.

According to my apprehension of the objection here brought forward, the words “zoologically impossible,” may be thus expanded. Under the present constitution of nature,

by which the lives and habits of animals are regulated, which confines them to certain climates and to certain kinds of food, not to be found out of those climates; it would be impossible to congregate specimens of their various tribes in any one given spot of the globe. But it is asserted by Moses that such a congregation did actually take place, on two different occasions. An assertion plainly contradicted by the known laws of nature cannot be true, and to make such an assertion, involves the guilt of falsehood. But falsehood cannot consist with inspiration; consequently, Moses was not inspired.

That to collect specimens of the "living inhabitants of the whole world," into one spot, is a task perhaps impracticable by human power, I am disposed to admit. But Moses does not attribute the act to human power, but to Divine agency, and this he does, directly in the first of the two cited instances, and by clear implication in the second. The objection, therefore, if directed to human agency, is altogether beside the question. It merely denies that which is not asserted by Moses.

If then the objection be at all relevant, it must regard Divine agency, and will amount to denying that it is possible for God to perform certain acts, under the present constitution of nature. Before this can be shewn, I apprehend it will be necessary to prove one of two things: Either that the Author of all things, is not the author of the laws of nature, and possesses no control over them, but is himself irresistibly controlled by them; or that, although he may be the author of those laws, yet having once established them, he is not at liberty to alter, suspend, or abrogate them in any particular.

When the objector shall have succeeded in settling one or other of these points upon a solid foundation, he will then, but not till then, be in a situation to allege his "zoologically impossible" fact, as conclusive evidence against the inspiration of Moses.

It may be laid down as a principle, without fear of exception, so far as I can see, that no fact related in a writing professing the character of inspiration, can be used as evidence against that profession, unless it be a fact plainly impossible in itself, or inconsistent with the character of the Divine Being, as discoverable by reason. Where, indeed, ought we

to expect to meet with extraordinary facts, if not in a book professing to relate the extraordinary interpositions of Providence? To say of such facts, that they are "impossible," according to the laws of this or that science, is merely to say, that they are extraordinary and miraculous facts. But the *nature* of a fact, in no wise affects the *evidence* of it, unless it fall within the general rule above stated. To convert water into wine; to restore vision to the blind,—by a word;—are facts chemically and surgically impossible: but who ever dreamt of deciding by such tests, on the truth of those facts?

If the writings of Moses, instead of being what they are, had contained only a narrative of simple and trivial occurrences; the very men who now affect to discredit them, on account of the extraordinary facts which they relate, would be the first to turn round and urge, with some better show of reason, that they could not regard as inspired, a book containing nothing more, than what might be related by a Pliny or a Buffon.

I shall conclude this argument, by placing two passages of Scripture in apposition.

"In the beginning, God created the heavens and the earth." Gen. i. 1.

"And out of the ground the Lord God formed every beast of the field, and every fowl of the air, and brought them to Adam to see what he would call them." Gen. ii. 19.

He who believes the fact stated in the first of these passages, need scarcely hesitate at the second, viewing its accomplishment as a question of power: and he who denies the second, because impossible according to some system of zoology; may, upon like reason, deny creation itself, because "impossible," according to the system of some atheistical philosopher.

In a subsequent passage of this lecture, Mr. Lawrence endeavours to shew, that a strange and absurd contradiction exists in the narrative comprised in the first, second, and fifth chapters of the book of Genesis. The account of his imagined discovery, will be best stated in his own words. He says, "The Mosaic account does not however make it quite clear, that the inhabitants of all the world descended from Adam and Eve." In a note he adds, "We are told, indeed, that Adam called his wife's name Eve, because she

“ was the mother of all living. But in the first chapter of
 “ Genesis we learn, that God created man, male and female;
 “ and this seems to have been previous to the formation of
 “ Eve, which did not take place till after the garden of
 “ Eden had been prepared. Again, we learn in the fifth
 “ chapter of Genesis, that ‘in the day that God created
 “ ‘ man, in the likeness of God made he him : male and fe-
 “ ‘ male created he them, and blessed them, and called their
 “ ‘ name Adam, in the day when they were created.’ ”

If Mr. Lawrence has ever read and attentively considered the writings of Moses ; if he has carefully examined and attempted to appreciate the profound wisdom of that system of religious and civil polity which they contain ; he must have perceived that the Hebrew lawgiver was no ordinary man. The work, viewed as an effort of mere human genius, displays a mind of the very first order, endowed with the most piercing sagacity, and with a capaciousness of thought fitted to embrace the destinies of nations ; a mind, ardent, powerful, and sublime. That an author of this character, should, in the very outset of his work, deliver a fact of great importance in a confused and negligent manner, seems very improbable ; but that he should say and unsay this fact, and that too, within the compass of a few sentences ; that he should contradict himself repeatedly, and commit such palpable and egregious blunders, as the most trivial and ordinary persons could not fail to detect, appears wholly incredible. The first feeling natural to a candid mind, upon the discovery of a real error in such a work, would be one of hesitation and mistrust in its own conclusions. If this be so, then surely to bring against it, rashly and carelessly, charges of error of the grossest kind, for which, at the same time, there exists not the slightest foundation ; can hardly be thought consistent with the exercise of due modesty and caution. But the lecturer was seemingly impatient to tell the world, in some shape or other, his contempt for the book of Genesis. Like the hero in Virgil, he starts up half-awake, seizes his arms, and rushes out ; resolved to do, he scarcely knows what ; but resolved at all events, to do something :

*Arma amens capit, nec sat rationis in armis
 Sed glomerare manum bello et concurrere in arcem
 Cum sociis ardent animi, furor iraque mentem
 Præcipitant.—Æneid, lib. 2.*

It will be an easy matter to shew, that no contradiction or obscurity exists in this portion of the Mosaic narrative.

The first chapter of Genesis gives a general account of the creation, and at verses 26 and 27, relates the creation of man, male and female, on the sixth day.

The second chapter, at the seventh verse, resumes the subject of the creation of man, and relates various particulars concerning it; also the creation of Eden, the law given by God to man, and the creation of woman. But in all this there occurs no note of time whatever, so that the whole narrative might be inserted, with perfect propriety, after the twenty-seventh verse of the first chapter; of which, indeed, it is merely an amplification.

This is no more than we frequently meet with in the conduct of historical narrations. The author, when a suitable occasion requires such a disposition of his materials, first gives a general and comprehensive view of his subject, and for the sake of unity, and to place the whole at once under the reader's eye, does not break the thread of his narration by stopping to enlarge on particulars. But, having mentioned at first cursorily, some topic of pre-eminent dignity and importance, he recurs to it afterwards, and dilates on it as he may judge necessary. This is precisely the arrangement which Moses has adopted in these two chapters, and the narrative given in the second, affords no more ground for supposing the creation of Eve to have been subsequent to the sixth day, than for supposing the creation of Adam himself to have been so. In chap. i. 27, we read, "So God created man in his own image—male and female created he them." In chap. ii. 22, "And the rib which the Lord God had taken from man, made he a woman." This latter passage gives in a more detailed manner, what in the former was dispatched in a single word. Again, in chap. i. 27, we read, "So God created man." In chap. ii. 7, "And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground." Here are not two creations of Adam, one subsequent to the other—the second narrative is merely an amplification of the first.

The passage cited from chap. v. ver. 12, completes this explanation in the most satisfactory manner. "In the day," that is, on the sixth day, "that God created man;—male and female created he them, (vid. chap. i. 27.) and

“blessed them, (chap. i. 28.) and called their name Adam “in the day when they were created.” It will be observed, that in no passage is it asserted that the creation of male and female was simultaneous; but only “*in the day*,” that “God created man, male and female created he “them.” The sixth day’s work, and the order of the work, appears then to have been this: The creation of Adam; the creation of Eden; the promulgation of the law; the formation of Eve. It seems to me, that a misunderstanding of this plain account can proceed only from extreme negligence, or wilful perversity. He whose ingenuity could render it perplexing and obscure, might hope to persuade mankind to walk about with lanthorns, in the full sunshine of a summer noon.

The reason which induced Adam to give his wife the name of Eve, “because she was the mother of all living,” does not refer, as supposed by the lecturer, to animal life. The true meaning he may learn, if he think it worth his while, from the commentators on the place. His own interpretation being erroneous, the argument raised on it falls of course to the ground.

I have now touched upon every anti-spiritual, and anti-scriptural argument contained in these lectures, and have endeavoured to shew, with what success others must determine, that every one of them is unsound and untenable. Perhaps ere this, the author of those arguments has himself found reason to adopt a similar opinion; for to me it is inconceivable, that a man of ability and acquirements, should for any length of time continue to be imposed on by fallacies so easy of detection. If any reader of the “*Lectures on Physiology*,” who has yielded his assent to those hollow doctrines, should be induced by these remarks but to inquire farther into the subject; his labour in reading them will be repaid, and my object in writing them will be attained. His inquiry, if stimulated by an honest love of truth, and carried on in a spirit but of common fairness, will assuredly lead him to reject those doctrines, and abjure them for ever; not merely as inert speculative falsehoods, but as principles actively injurious to the most important interests of mankind.

FINIS.